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Economists have traditionally assumed that people’s productivity in the labor market 
is determined solely by the choices they make over the course of their lifetime and 
have paid relatively little attention to the possibility that productivity might be 
influenced by the attributes and decisions of the people they live and work with. This 
dissertation reports evidence that such productivity spillovers exist, both within 
households and within firms. The first chapter examines whether a person’s work 
hours are influenced by his/her likelihood of changing marital state. Data from the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 are used and three different methods for 
measuring the probability of marriage and divorce are employed. Consistent with 
theoretical predictions, married women are found to work more when they face a high 
probability of divorce. This relationship holds both over an individual’s life-cycle and 
across people with different inherent risks of divorce. The second chapter explores 
whether team-mate performance influences individual performance and salaries in 
Major League Baseball. Team-mates may inflate a player’s output in a single year or 
they may have a lasting influence on his performance. Evidence of these effects, 
which are termed spillovers and learning, respectively, are found among both pitchers 
and non-pitchers. Pitchers are more likely to post low earned run averages if other 
pitchers on their team achieve low earned run averages in the same season or the 
previous season. Batters tend to have high batting averages if their team-mates had 
high batting averages in the previous season. Team performance measures are found to 
 have some direct influence on salary, however they operate largely indirectly, by 
augmenting individual performance. Finally, the third chapter examines the effects co-
worker ability has on wages in the wider labor market, using matched employer-
employee data that have been constructed by the United States Census Bureau. The 
average levels of education and tenure among a person’s co-workers are found to have 
a positive effect on wages, indicating the presence of human capital spillovers. Co-
worker tenure has a bigger impact on new entrants to a firm. In contrast, co-worker 
education has a larger effect on highly-educated workers. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Labour economists have long concerned themselves with the productivity of 
workers in the economy. Productivity, loosely defined as the value of a person’s 
output per unit of time, should determine the amount he/she is paid in any competitive 
labour market. Although the simplest models of labour supply exclude any possibility 
that a worker’s productivity can change, models of education and training allow a 
worker to invest in his/her own future productivity and, hence, wage rate. Nonetheless, 
very few studies have considered the possibility that an individual’s productivity can 
be directly influenced by the attributes and decisions of the people he/she lives or 
works with. 
 This dissertation examines the possibility that a person’s human capital and wage 
levels may be affected by the decisions and attributes of the people he/she interacts 
closely with, specifically the person’s spouse and co-workers. Since knowledge can to 
a certain extent be considered a public good, these effects have been termed 
productivity, or human capital, spillovers. 
 Under the most basic textbook models of labour supply, workers have no control 
over their productivity levels. In the classical static model of labour supply, each 
worker is paid a fixed wage and chooses only how much time to devote to the labour 
market. Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) note that this model can be extended to “allow 
for “wages” to vary as a function of hours of work with relatively straightforward 
modifications of the subsequent analyses” (p. 1588). However, an inherent weakness 
of the static model is that it permits no way to distinguish between productivity 
improvements achieved by on-the-job experience and the effects of a wage schedule 
that simply rewards long hours, for example overtime pay. Life-cycle models of 
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labour supply typically assume a wage that grows according to an exogenous process, 
perhaps with a distinction between permanent and transitory income. 
 Other models explicitly consider the decisions made by individuals (and 
sometimes firms) about how much human capital to acquire. Models of the return to 
education usually involve individuals choosing a level of schooling to maximize 
lifetime utility. Although this relaxes the assumption of the basic labour supply 
models that productivity is exogenous, schooling is modelled as a one-off decision, 
with a fixed lifetime stream of income resulting from any choice. Moreover, an 
individual can only influence his/her own human capital. Becker’s (1964) seminal 
model of on-the-job training similarly involves a decision of whether to undertake 
firm-specific or general training. Specific training is likely to only take place if worker 
and firm share the costs, meaning that the human capital of the former is affected by 
the actions of the latter. However, the firm will only contribute to the training costs if 
it finds it profitable to do so – there are no externalities and each employee is 
considered in isolation. 
 While the mainstream literature has assumed that individuals can determine only 
their own productivity levels, a number of authors have considered the possibility that 
productivity spillovers exist. Given the amount of time that adults spend with their 
spouses and co-workers, it seems reasonable to think that they might be the source of 
any such spillovers. Data from the 2006 American Time Use Survey indicate that men 
aged 25 to 54 spend on average 167 minutes per day in the presence of their spouses 
and 329 minutes at work and work-related activities (and presumably in the presence 
of work colleagues). Similarly, women aged 25 to 54 spend 162 minutes with their 
spouses and 217 minutes at work. 
 The decision to marry is likely to have a major influence on a person’s human 
capital accumulation. Becker (1965) analysed marriage within a utility maximization 
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framework. Under his framework, a person will choose to marry if he/she perceives 
that the utility from that state will exceed that from remaining single. One benefit of 
marriage is that it allows couples to specialize in either labor market work or 
household production. Those married people who specialize in market work are likely 
to acquire more human capital than single people and thus should experience faster-
growing wages. Since individuals aim to maximize lifetime utility, not only should 
their current marital state influence their degree of labor market specialization, but 
also their expectations of future changes in marital state. For example, once married, 
the likelihood of divorce may influence a person’s decision of how much time to 
spend in the labor market. 
 In Chapter 2, I examine how the work hours of married men and women are 
affected by their likelihood of divorce, as well as how single people are influenced by 
the probability of marriage. I present the first dynamic model of labour supply in the 
presence of marital instability, wherein individuals face a certain probability of 
changing from married to single or vice versa. This implies that the probability of 
marriage increases work hours by unmarried people if their expected marginal utility 
with respect to hours is higher in the married state than in the unmarried state. 
Similarly, the divorce probability will have positive effect on hours if a person has a 
marginal utility that is higher in the unmarried state but a spouse with marginal utility 
that is higher in the married state. Under the assumption that men earn more than 
women, I show that this means that single women work less when marriage is likely 
and married women work more when divorce is likely, while the conclusions for men 
are the reverse. A major issue in the empirical analysis is how to measure the marital 
transition probabilities. Drawing on data from the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth, I take three different approaches to measuring the probabilities of marriage and 
divorce and find broad support for the predictions of the theory. 
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 People’s work colleagues may also influence their human capital, but for different 
reasons to intra-household spillovers. While spouses may be viewed as complements 
in production, to the extent that they have different skills that are valuable to the 
household, employees within a firm may be considered substitutes, insofar as they 
share many of the same skills. Workers might learn from highly productive co-
workers or managers or there may be pure spillovers where a person benefits from 
working alongside talented colleagues without acquiring any permanent increase in 
ability. 
 One of the earliest papers to consider the effect of human capital spillovers within 
firms was by Mayer (1960). He provided a very simple example, whereby a worker of 
ability  has the choice of working alone and receiving a wage equal to  or 
supervising s less able workers with average ability . In the latter case, he is able to 
“pass on” his ability, meaning that his total profit is 
2P 2P
1P
)( 12 PPs − . He will choose this 
option so long as , with equality for the marginal entrepreneur. It is also 
possible to have a third hierarchy level, whereby the most able individuals (who have 
skill ) hire some of the first-stage entrepreneurs previously described. The profit 
earned by these second-stage entrepreneurs is  and the marginal 
entrepreneur must satisfy . 
212 )( PPPs ≥−
( 3
2 Ps −
3P
)( 23
2 PP −s
)() 132 PPsP −=
 In Chapter 3, I investigate whether productivity spillovers exist in a very special 
industry – major league baseball. A key advantage of analysing sports data is that they 
include many detailed measures of individual and team productivity, or performance. I 
exploit a rich dataset containing annual information on all major league players and 
look for evidence of transitory, or “pure”, productivity spillovers and long-lasting 
productivity spillovers, or “learning”. Evidence of the former is found for pitchers 
only, while evidence of the latter is found for both pitchers and non-pitchers. Since 
team-mate performance directly influences individual performance, it is easy to 
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understate the effect of former on earnings over a player’s career. For that reason, I 
estimate the short- and long-run salary effects of team-mate performance. Pitchers are 
paid better if they play for teams with weak pitching and hitting, whereas non-pitchers 
are paid better if they play alongside hitters with high averages and who walk often, 
with much stronger effects over the course of a player’s entire career. 
 Finally, in Chapter 4, I attempt to generalise the analysis of intra-workplace 
spillovers to the entire labour market by using matched employer-employee data that 
have been assembled by the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics programme 
at the United States Census Bureau. These data are based on each state’s 
unemployment insurance records and allow the researcher to follow a worker from job 
to job over his/her entire career and also to identify all of the person’s co-workers in 
any job at any point in time. However, as mentioned above, unlike in professional 
sports, few direct measures of productivity are available in the wider labour market. 
Since it is based on administrative records, the matched employer-employee data 
contain even fewer. One desirable productivity measure is job tenure. This can be 
calculated from the data, however there is a missing data problem arising from the fact 
that retrospective job start information is not available for those jobs that commenced 
before a state began contributing data to the programme. To circumvent this problem, 
I impute missing values for job start date using multiple imputations techniques and 
drawing on additional data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation. I 
then use the completed tenure variable in a set of earnings equations, along with years 
of schooling. The average tenure and education level at an establishment are found to 
have a positive effect on the earnings of both men and women. Average tenure has a 
bigger impact on new entrants to a firm, while average education has a larger effect on 
the most highly-educated women in a firm but roughly the same effect on men. 
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 Taken together, these studies indicate a significant, if modest, role of spillovers 
within families or firms. Less specialisation takes place within “unstable” marriages, 
while people are more productive when they are surrounded by highly-able 
colleagues. 
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2. The effects of divorce risk on the labor supply of 
married couples 
 
“A divorcée is a woman who got married so she didn’t have to work,  
but now works so she doesn’t have to get married.” 
ANNA MAGNANI 
 
 It is a commonly-held assumption that married men earn more than unmarried men 
because they are able to specialize in labor market work and, hence, acquire more 
human capital, while their wives perform the bulk of unpaid tasks within the 
household. In this case, the event of divorce should have important economic 
consequences for both husband and wife. Divorced men are likely to experience 
declining wages relative to men who remain married, as their accumulated human 
capital gradually depreciates. Women are likely to be forced to enter the labor market 
or increase their hours of work after divorce and be paid less than single women, who 
have more human capital. However, if women make labor supply decisions optimally, 
taking into account the probability of their marriage dissolving, then they may choose 
to devote more time to market work while still married, in order to boost their future 
earnings capacity in the event of divorce. Presumably, the higher the probability of 
divorce is, the more hours a married woman will want to work. This phenomenon 
should be observed both across groups with different divorce rates and over time, as 
couples assess the quality of their match and decide whether to continue their 
marriage. 
 Figure 2.1 displays the evolution of the labor force participation rate among 
married women in the United States over the past half-century, as well as the number 
of divorces per 1000 married women and the real hourly wage for employed married 
women. The labor force participation rate reached a plateau in the 1990s after four 
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decades of steady growth. Meanwhile, the divorce rate rose sharply in the 1960s and 
1970s, before declining somewhat. Wages grew in most periods, but most steeply in 
the 1990s. 
 Previous research has largely attributed the post-war increase in female 
participation in the United States labor market to growth in the real wage offered to 
women. However, estimates suggest that this can only explain around half of the total 
increase in female participation rates. Furthermore, Shapiro and Shaw (1983) noted 
that during the 1970s, labor force participation by married women continued to grow, 
despite a stagnant real wage, as seen in Figure 2.1. More recently, Blau and Kahn 
Figure 2.1 
Trends in labor force participation, divorce and wages among 
married women 
Sources: Divorce rate (divorces per married women aged 15 and over): Clarke (1995) and author’s 
calculations, based on data from National Center for Health Statistics; labour force 
participation rate: United States Census Bureau (2003), based on Current Population Survey 
data; wage rate: author’s calculations based on March Current Population Survey data. 
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(2007) presented evidence that married women’s labor supply function shifted 
significantly to the right in the 1980s, with little movement in the 1990s, and that the 
difference in this shift accounted for the more dramatic growth in female labor supply 
during the former decade. Given that divorce rates were increasing prior to the 1980s 
and fell leading into the 1990s, it is plausible that these puzzles may at least in part be 
explained by a reaction of women to changes in marital instability. 
 Apart from a strand of literature investigating the effect of divorce law reform, few 
previous studies have examined the effect that the threat of divorce has on the labor 
supply decisions of married couples and none of these has presented any theory that 
might explain this behavior. As Lundberg and Pollak (1996) noted, if “the analysis of 
marriage and divorce is awkward, the analysis of marital decisions in the shadow of 
divorce is even more so” (p. 143). Furthermore, previous papers have used only cross-
sectional data or a few years of panel data and have thus been unable to examine 
whether individuals respond to changes in divorce probability from period to period or 
whether the relationship strictly occurs across people. 
 This paper represents the first attempt to model the effect both marriage and 
divorce probabilities have on labor supply and wages within a utility maximization 
framework. I develop a theoretical model that is based on a setting in which men and 
women each maximize their own lifetime utility and married couples interact in a non-
cooperative manner. Wages are determined by the number of hours a person has 
worked in the past. The probability of marriage is found to increase work hours for 
those unmarried people who expect to marry someone with a lower wage rate. This is 
more likely to be the case for men than women. Conversely, among married couples, 
an increase in the likelihood of divorce has a positive effect on labor supply for those 
who earn less per hour than their spouses: something that is likely for women but not 
men. 
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 This model is then tested using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (NLSY) 1979 for the period 1979-2004. Cox proportional hazard models are 
used to generate estimated probabilities of marriage among single people and divorce 
among married people each period, unlike previous studies, which use probit 
specifications and do not consider never-married people. The estimated marriage and 
divorce probabilities are then used as explanatory variables in labor supply 
regressions. For those in their first marriage, a 0.01 increase in the annual probability 
of divorce results in a wife working around 60 extra hours a year, consistent with 
theoretical predictions. Higher marriage probabilities are associated with increases in 
the hours worked by single men, but also among single women. These relationships 
persist both across individuals and over a person’s life-cycle, indicating that inter-
temporal maximization with respect to divorce risk occurs. For the first time, I also 
uncover evidence in support of the theoretical predictions using individuals’ 
evaluations of how satisfied they are with their marriages as a proxy for divorce risk. 
These data provide a clearly exogenous measure of divorce likelihood and suggest that 
women who are unhappy with their marriages work significantly more than other 
married women. 
 The next section provides an overview of past work examining the relationship 
between wages, labor supply and divorce, before I present my theoretical model. After 
describing the NLSY dataset, I then discuss my empirical strategy and results. 
 
1. Literature review 
 Numerous previous studies have established that married men have higher 
earnings than never-married men. Although it continues to be the subject of debate, 
one persuasive explanation for this is that married men are more productive because 
they are able to devote more time to labor market activities and, hence, accumulate 
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more human capital, while their wives specialize in household production.1 If intra-
marriage specialization is important, one should also expect adjustments to wages and 
labor supply for both men and women after marriages dissolve. In general, studies 
indicate that divorce tends to result in higher labor force participation rates for women, 
although this relationship seems to have weakened over recent decades.2 Furthermore, 
men’s wages appear to fall after divorce.3 
 Haurin (1989) was notable in that he presented a model of utility maximization 
that can explain the relationship between labor supply and divorce. In this model, there 
are two periods and women choose work hours to maximize utility in the face of 
uncertainty over the employment prospects of their husbands in the second period. 
Divorce can be viewed as one possible (extreme) shock to a husband’s labor supply, 
since it is treated as being equivalent to a husband not working at all. Haurin shows 
that leisure demanded by a married woman in the second period is negatively related 
to the deviation of her husband’s work hours from the expected amount.4 He tests this 
relationship using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Women. 
                                                 
1 Korenman and Neumark (1991), Daniel (1992), Blackburn and Korenman (1994), Gray (1997), Chun 
and Lee (2001) and Cohen (2002) all found support for the so-called “productivity hypothesis”, whereas 
Jacobsen and Rayack (1996), Loh (1996) and Hersch and Stratton (2000) concluded that productivity 
differences cannot explain the marriage premium. In addition, Nakosteen and Zimmer (1987), Cornwell 
and Rupert (1997) and Millimet et al. (2004) reported evidence in favor of the rival “selection 
hypothesis”, whereby men who are more productive in the labor market also tend to be more likely to 
marry. 
2 Johnson and Skinner (1988) found that women increase their labor supply after divorce, although this 
is mostly due to an increase in labor force participation than in work hours. Seitz (1999) noted that, 
among whites, remarried women have higher labor force participation rates than women in their first 
marriage, but that there are no significant differences between the participation rates of black women 
who are single, divorced, married or remarried. In contrast, Bedard and Deschênes (2005) concluded 
that divorce has no effect on female labor force participation, although it does increase hours and weeks 
of work. 
3 Gray (1997) reported a negative relationship between wages and years since divorce or separation, 
although the causes of this have changed over time. Ahituv and Lerman (2005) found that for men, 
divorce results in a fall in wages and hours worked relative to a continuing marriage. 
4 It should be noted that, unlike the model presented later, Haurin explains labor supply responses to 
actual divorce, not the risk of divorce in the future. 
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Consistent with predictions, divorce is found to induce the largest labor supply 
response among women, relative to widowhood or a husband’s unexpected 
unemployment or health deterioration. 
 To the best of the author’s knowledge, only six papers have explicitly examined 
the effect anticipated divorce risk has on labor supply. Greene and Quester (1982) 
used United States Census Bureau data to create predicted divorce probabilities for 
women based on their demographic characteristics, using a model of marital 
dissolution developed earlier by Orcutt et al. (1976). They found that among married 
women, labor supply increases with divorce risk. 
 Johnson and Skinner (1986) estimated a simultaneous model of future divorce 
probability and labor supply among married woman using PSID data for 1972. Their 
approach was to obtain predicted probabilities of future divorce from probit equations 
and use these in labor force participation regressions in place of actual divorce. They 
found that women increase their labor force participation in the three years prior to 
separation, noting that the increases in the divorce rate may explain one-third of the 
increase in female labor supply over the past half-century. Gray (1995) took a very 
similar approach with NLSY 1979 data for 1988 and also found that women who 
experience divorce within three years are more likely to work than other married 
women, ceteris paribus. Conversely, a married woman’s labor force participation 
decision has no influence on her probability of divorcing within the following three 
years. 
 Like Johnson and Skinner, Montalto and Gerner (1998) examined PSID data, 
however they considered both men and women and used fifteen years of observations, 
rather than a single baseline year. A drawback of this was that only a limited number 
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of variables were available.5 Montalto and Gerner estimated first-stage probit 
equations for both divorce among married people and remarriage among divorcés and 
divorcées. Results from their second-stage labor supply equations suggest that 
expectation of divorce is positively associated with labor force participation and hours 
among married women, while expectation of remarriage is negatively related to labor 
force participation by divorced women. Among men, probability of divorce reduces 
labor force participation and probability of remarriage increases participation. 
 Austen (2004) analyzed Australian data and used a Cox proportional hazard model 
to estimate divorce hazard rates for women in 1991. She found that a 10 percentage 
point rise in the risk of divorce would increase the probability of a married woman 
working full-time by 13.8 percentage points. 
 Unlike the other five papers, Sen (2000) constructs a longitudinal dataset and 
compares two cohorts: the NLSYW for 1968-1983 and the NLSY 1979 for 1979-
1993. Her measure of divorce risk was a dummy variable indicating whether divorce 
or separation occurred in the next three years. To control for the potential endogeneity 
of future divorce, Sen tried both using the age at time of marriage as an instrument and 
substituting the predicted probability of divorce from an unspecified probit equation in 
place of actual divorce. Her results suggest that the risk of divorce significantly 
increases labor supply, but by less in the more recent cohort.6 
 One further paper uses time series techniques to analyze aggregate time series data 
for the divorce rate and the labor force participation rate among married women. 
                                                 
5 Most significantly, Montalto and Gerner have no information on respondents’ marital histories. Other 
than the differences in functional form, their divorce probability variable is identified solely by spousal 
characteristics, which all other authors enter as regressors in the labor supply equation. The authors also 
include employment status in the divorce and remarriage probit equations, counter to the argument that 
this variable is endogenously determined. 
6 Although both Montalto and Gerner and Sen used panel datasets, neither considered panel estimation 
techniques for the divorce or labor supply equations. 
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Bremmer and Kesselring (2004) found that an increase in the divorce rate results in a 
long-run increase in the participation rate. 
 In addition to these studies, a strand of literature has developed which utilizes 
exogenous changes in divorce laws to examine the effect the costs associated with 
divorce have on the labor supply decisions of married women, while circumventing 
the problems associated with the endogeneity of these variables. These papers rely on 
a natural experiment, whereby states implemented “no-fault” divorce legislation at 
different times. No-fault laws are assumed to reduce the costs associated with divorce. 
Their effect on the incidence of divorce is less clear-cut and there is no consensus in 
the literature on whether there is a significant relationship.7 
 Among the papers examining the labor market effects of divorce law changes, 
Peters (1986) and Parkman (1992) both used Current Population Survey (CPS) data 
and found that no-fault divorce legislation increases labor participation rates among 
married women. Parkman attributed this to the fact that women who do not participate 
in the labor market during marriage receive less compensation for their loss of human 
capital under no-fault laws. This is because these laws reduce the bargaining power of 
women and, instead, place more importance on property division laws, which 
recognize only physical and financial assets and ignore human capital. In response, 
married women in no-fault states are more likely to work in order to insulate 
themselves from the potential costs of divorce. 
 Using data from the Census, CPS and PSID, Gray (1998) extended the argument 
that marital property laws have an important effect on the work decisions of married 
women by looking at the interaction between the type of property law and no-fault 
                                                 
7 Among others, Allen (1992) and Friedberg (1998) reported that no-fault laws increased the likelihood 
of divorce, while Peters (1986) found no effect. Recent evidence by Wolfers (2006) suggests that while 
divorce law reform leads to higher divorce rates during the first decade after the change in law, it has no 
long-term effect on the divorce rate. 
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legislation. He found that a move to no-fault divorce is associated with a decrease in 
labor supply among married women in states with property laws that tend to favor the 
husband but an increase in labor supply in states with property laws that tend to 
redistribute assets to the wife, noting that this is consistent with a bargaining model of 
marriage where non-market time is divided between leisure and household production. 
In contrast, Chiappori et al. (2002) reported that married women tend to work fewer 
hours in states where divorce law is favorable to women and vice versa. 
 
2. Theoretical model 
 In this section, I present a model of labor supply in which individuals choose their 
hours of work in each period to maximize lifetime utility. Unmarried people take their 
wage rate and the probability of marriage as given, while married people take their 
own wage rate, their spouses’ wage rate and the probability of divorce as given. 
Wages are determined by past hours of work. In contrast to other models of the 
division of labor within marriages, our approach assumes a non-cooperative 
relationship between spouses, so that the hours worked by each constitute a subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium.8 
 
a. Structure of model 
 Consider the population of married people. In each period, their utility is strictly 
concave in consumption, C, and weakly concave in home production, H:9 
                                                 
8 Other approaches are cooperative decision making, e.g. Daniel (1992), or cooperative bargaining, e.g. 
Lundberg and Pollak (1993). Lundberg and Pollak (1996) provide a comparison of the three 
frameworks. One previous paper that considered labor supply and marital status over the life-cycle is 
van der Klaauw (1996), who analyzed the marriage and labor force participation decisions of women. 
9 Allowing for a utility function that is strictly concave in H complicates the model significantly. It 
should be noted that similar models, such as that of Iyigun (2005), feature utility functions that are 
weakly concave in both C and H. 
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 HCHCu δ+= ln),( . (2.1) 
 Consumption is derived from one’s own earnings, which are the product of wages, 
w, and hours of work, n, the earnings of one’s spouse and the couple’s non-labor 
income, 2R. A fraction of one’s total income, λ−1 , is conferred to one’s spouse. This 
assumption is in contrast to the income pooling assumption made under the common 
preference approach to family behavior.10 Non-wage income is shared equally 
between the couple, so that each receives R. 
 Home production is equal to the total hours spent at home by the married couple. It 
is a public good, insofar as the same amount is available for consumption by both 
husband and wife (see, for example, Iyigun (2005)). I do not model leisure and 
normalize the total hours to be devoted by each person to work and home production 
to be 1. Hence, the maximum possible amount of home production for the couple in 
any period is 2. 
 Throughout, barred variables and parameters will refer to husbands and unbarred 
variables will refer to wives. The wife’s utility in any period, t, is then given by: 
 )2())1(ln(),,,,( tttttttttttt nnRnwnwRnwnwu −−++−+= δλλ , (2.2) 
and the husband’s by: 
 )2())1ln((),,,,( tttttttttttt nnRnwnwRnwnwu −−+++−= δλλ , (2.3) 
where tt RR = . 
 Competitive asset markets are assumed, meaning that all non-labor income grows 
at the rate r, which can be interpreted as the interest rate: 
 ; (2.4) tt RrR )1(1 +=+
 tt RrR )1(1 +=+ . (2.5) 
 In any period, log wages are assumed to be equal to one’s accumulated stock of 
                                                 
10 If == λλ ½ then we would have income pooling, however, in this case, the model reduces to 
situation where only the spouse with the higher wage works at all. 
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human capital.11 Each period, the stock of human capital depreciates at rate ρ but is 
augmented by the amount tnθ . Hence: 
 ttt nww θρ +−=+ ln)1(ln 1 ; (2.6) 
 ttt nww θρ +−=+ ln)1(ln 1 . (2.7) 
 Between any two adjacent periods t and 1+t  there is an exogenous possibility that 
the pair will separate. This happens with probability tγ . An unmarried woman’s 
single-period utility is: 
 )1()ln(),,( ttttttt nRnwRnwu −++= δ , (2.8) 
where  if the individual separated between periods t and t+1, i.e. 
divorcing couples split non-wage income equally. An unmarried man’s utility is 
analogous. Marriage (or remarriage) occurs between periods with probability 
tt RrR )1(1 +=+
tη . 
Marrying couples pool their non-labor income, so that =1= ++1 tt RR  
2/))(1( tt RRr ++ . The marital transition probabilities are revealed at the beginning of 
each period and are independent, i.e. )( jtjtt EE ++ = γγ  and )( jtjtt EE ++ = ηη , . 0>∀j
 Utility is assumed to be time separable and all individuals are assumed to live for T 
periods and have the same discount factor, β, so that lifetime expected utility is given 
by: 
 . (2.9) ∑
=
++=
T
j
jtjtt
j
tt HCuEHCU
0
),(),( β
In each period, a person chooses his/her work hours in order to maximize lifetime 
utility, taking all other variables as given. The choice of hours determines the 
following period’s wage. In other words, n is the control variable and w is a state 
variable. 
 My approach will be to solve the problem recursively, determining an exact 
solution for the final period first, before approximating a solution in all earlier periods. 
 
                                                 
11 Equations 6 and 7 imply that wages are an increasing function of human capital. 
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b. Solution in the final period 
 An unmarried woman’s problem in period T can be written: 
 . (2.10) )}1(){ln(
max
),( TTTT
T
TT
U
T nRnwn
RwV −++≡ δ
The solution to Equation 2.10 is: 
 
T
TU
T w
Rn −= δ
1* . (2.11) 
Equation 2.11 implies an indirect utility function of the following form: 
 )11(ln),(
T
TT
TT
U
T w
RwRwV +−+= δδδ . (2.12) 
 Similarly, a married woman’s problem in period T is: 
 )}2())1({ln(
max
),,,( TTTTTTT
T
tttt
M
T nnRnwnwn
RnwwV −−++−+≡ δλλ . (2.13) 
The solution is: 
 
T
TTT
T w
Rnwn λ
λ
δ
+−−= )1(1 . (2.14) 
 Equation 2.14 represents what I will term the married woman’s “labor supply 
response function”. This is not a labor supply function, because tn  is not exogenous 
but, rather, is determined by the utility maximization of the woman’s husband. A 
married man’s labor supply response function is analogous to Equation 2.14: 
 
T
TTT
T w
Rnwn λ
λ
δ
+−−= )1(1 . (2.15) 
 Husband and wife determine their optimal hours of work simultaneously according 
to Equations 2.15 and 2.14, respectively. For a Nash equilibrium in the period T 
subgame, both spouses must choose a level of n that is a best response to the other’s 
value. Since each labor supply response function is a linear function of the spouse’s 
work hours, there is a unique Nash equilibrium, akin to the case of a Cournot duopoly. 
Making the assumption that >λ ½ and >λ ½ (i.e. neither spouse gives more than half 
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),,;( TTTTT Rwwnn
),,;( TTTTT Rwwnn
Tn
*
T
n
Tn
*
T
n
Figure 2.2 
Nash equilibrium between the labour supply response 
functions of a husband and wife 
of his/her income to the other), the labor supply functions that arise are:12 
 ))((
1 TTT
T Rww
n λδλδλλ +−−+=
12111*M λλλ −− ; (2.16) 
 ))121(11(
1
*
TT
T
M
T Rww
n λ
λ
δ
λ
λδλλ
λ −+−−−+= . (2.17) 
 To examine this equilibrium, Figure 2.2 plots Equations 2.14 and 2.15 together in 
),( nn  space. Note that the wife’s labor supply response function is linear in n  and 
vice versa. The slope of the husband’s curve is ww )1/( λλ −− , while the slope of his 
wife’s curve is ww λλ /)1( −− . Figure 2.2 is drawn to illustrate the common case 
where λ  is close to one and λ  is significantly less than one, i.e. the husband transfers 
a greater fraction of his income to his wife than he receives of her income. In this case, 
the husband’s labor supply response curve is nearly vertical, while the wife’s slopes 
downward somewhat. 
 Together, Equations 2.16 and 2.17 yield the following indirect utility function for a 
married woman in period T: 
                                                 
12 Equations 16 and 17 make use of the fact that TT RR = . 
 20
 T
T
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M
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2)ln(),,,,( λλλλ
λλδδ
λ −−−+−+=  
  ))12)1((1)12 TT
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T Rww
R δλ
λλλδλ
λ −+−−−+ . (2.18) 
 
c. Solution in earlier periods 
 In periods t < T, a person’s utility maximization problem depends on the expected 
future utility in different marital states, as well as the probability of being in those 
states. For example, an unmarried woman in period 1−T  faces the following problem: 
  )1(){ln(
max
),( 1111
1
111 −−−−
−
−−− −++≡ TTTT
T
TT
U
T nRnw
n
RwV δ
  ))},()1()
2
,,,(( 1111 TT
U
TTT
TT
TTT
M
TTT RwVE
RRnwwVE −−−− −+++ ηηβ , (2.19) 
subject to: 
 11ln)1(ln −− +−= TTT nww θρ ; (2.20) 
 ; (2.21) 1)1( −+= TT RrR
 There is no closed form solution to this problem, hence my approach is to replace 
 and  with first-order Taylor series approximations in , MTV
U
TV Twln Twln ,  and TR
TR  around the mean values, , wˆ wˆ , Rˆ  and Rˆ : 
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U
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ln)
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ˆ
1(),( δδς +−+= ; (2.22) 
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where: 
 w
w
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T ˆlnˆ
ˆ
1ln δδδς +−+−≡ ; (2.24) 
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 I will assume that 1ln +tt wE  and 1+tt RE  are uncorrelated with , . In other 
words, a single woman cannot influence the income distribution of her potential 
husbands by her work decisions. Substituting Equations 2.20-2.23 into Equation 2.19 
and solving for n then yields: 
tn t∀
 
1
1
1
*
1
1
−
−
−
− −−= T
T
T
U
T w
Rn ϕδ , (2.26) 
where: 
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1)(1( 1 w
R
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δη −−+ − . (2.27) 
In a similar fashion, a married woman’s problem in period 1−T  is: 
 )2())1({ln(
max
),( 1111111
1
111 −−−−−−−
−
−−− −−++−+≡ TTTTTTT
T
TT
M
T nnRnwnwn
RwV δλλ  
  )},,,()1()),(( 1111 TTTT
M
TTTTT
U
TTT RnwwVERwVE −−−− −++ γγβ , (2.28) 
subject to: 
 11ln)1(ln −− +−= TTT nww θρ ; (2.29) 
 11ln)1(ln −− +−= TTT nww θρ ; (2.30) 
 ; (2.31) 1)1( −+= TT RrR
 1)1( −+= TT RrR . (2.32) 
Once again, I approximate the period T indirect utility functions with Equations 2.22 
and 23.13 This produces the following labor supply response function: 
                                                 
13 Note that here  is known with certainty. MTV
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and, for a Nash equilibrium in the period T-1 subgame, the following labor supply 
function: 
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 Continuing to solve the problem in this recursive fashion, I can derive labor supply 
functions for every period. The general form for a single woman’s labor supply 
function is: 
 
t
t
t
U
t w
Rn −−= ϕδ
1* , (2.37) 
and the general forms for a married woman’s labor supply response function and labor 
supply function are, respectively: 
 
t
ttt
t
t w
Rnwn λ
λ
φδ
+−−−=
)1(1 , (2.38) 
 ))121(11(
1
*
tt
ttt
M
t Rww
n λ
λ
φδ
λ
λφδλλ
λλ −+−
−−−−+= , (2.39) 
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d. Interpreting the solution 
 Equations 2.19 and 2.28 reveal that there are three components to a person’s 
lifetime utility, as evaluated at any period Tt < : the utility derived from one’s current 
earnings, the utility from contemporaneous consumption of the household good and 
discounted expected future utility. δ represents a person’s marginal utility from an 
hour of household production, whereas tϕ  and tφ  represent the marginal future utility 
with respect to  for people in different marital states. tn tϕ  and tφ  are time varying 
because the number of future periods varies and because γ and η change over time. I 
impose the constraints δϕ <t  and δφ <t , t∀ , which ensures that a married or 
unmarried person will work in a given period only if the prevailing wage is above 
some positive reservation wage. If δϕ >t  or δφ >t  then the person would choose to 
work the maximum number of hours in that period even if the wage was zero, because 
the marginal discounted future utility of an additional hour of work outweighed the 
marginal disutility of a one less hour of household production. 
 The labor supply functions embodied in Equations 2.37 and 2.39 represent two 
rectangular hyperbolas in  space. So long as ),( wn tt ww >  and tt Rw δ2>  then  is 
less curved than . If, in addition, η and γ are both less than ½ then the horizontal 
asymptote for  is greater than the asymptote for . In this case, there is a 
threshold wage, below which married women work less than unmarried women, but 
above which the reverse is true, as depicted in Figure 2.3. This illustrates intra-
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*U
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household specialization: a married person with a high wage works more than an 
otherwise-identical single person, but a low-paid married person works less and 
engages in household production instead. 
 
e. Comparative statics 
 I wish to examine the impact of the risk of marriage and divorce on labor supply, 
given the framework discussed above. Consider the derivatives of Equations 2.37 and 
2.39 with respect to tη  and tγ , respectively: 
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 Equation 2.44 states that a unmarried woman will decrease her work hours in 
response to an increase in the likelihood of marriage if an extra hour of work would 
increase her expected utility more if she married than if she remained single and vice 
versa. The situation for married women is slightly more complicated. Equation 2.45 
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Figure 2.3 
Labour supply functions of married and single persons 
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states that an increase in the probability of divorce will increase a married woman’s 
labor supply if her marginal future utility with respect to work hours is greater when 
unmarried than married and her husband’s marginal future utility with respect to hours 
is greater when married than unmarried. In Appendix 1, I prove by induction that so 
long as ttt Rww +>  and 1<δ  then MtUt 11 ++ >νν  and UtMt 11 ++ >νν , . This means that 
the derivatives in Equations 2.44 and 2.45 are unambiguously negative and positive, 
respectively. 
t∀
 Note that hours of work are also influenced by the expected marital transition 
probabilities in all future periods. This means, for example, that single people 
determine their labor supply taking into account the future likelihood of divorce. The 
one-period-ahead recurrence derivatives in this sense are: 
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 Hence, ceteris paribus, single people will work more when their future divorce 
probabilities are high and married people will work less when their remarriage 
probabilities are high. 
 
f. Extensions to the model 
 An obvious omission of the model described above is the treatment of children. 
Married women may choose to stay out of the labor market not because they are less 
productive in paid work than their husbands but because they wish to raise a family. 
This could be incorporated into the model in a simple manner by modifying the utility 
function, Equation 2.2, to allow men and women to have different productivities in 
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home production, as follows: 
 )2())1(ln(),,,,( tttttttttttt nnRnwnwRnwnwu ααδλλ −−++−+= , (2.48) 
where α  and α  are the maximum amounts of the household good that the wife and 
husband could produce, respectively. If one treats child-rearing as a component of the 
household public good, then one might assume that αα ≥>1 . In this case, the above 
analysis will hold, except that δ  is replaced in the labor supply functions with αδ  or 
δα  where appropriate. This means that both married and unmarried women will work 
less than under the assumption of equal home productivity. 
 Another unrealistic assumption of the model is that the marital transition 
probabilities are exogenous, when they are likely to be functions of the chosen hours 
of work. This will be an important consideration in the empirical analysis in Section 4. 
The above model can be modified so that the transition probabilities are functions of 
the hours in all previous periods: 
 ),...,( 11 −= tt nnγγ ; (2.49) 
 ),...,( 11 −= tt nnηη . (2.50) 
 In this case, the key derivatives in Equations 2.44 and 2.45 will be unchanged, 
although the derivative of hours with respect to future transition probabilities will be 
altered. The fully endogenous case where tγ  and tη  are functions of contemporaneous 
work hours is more complicated and may give rise to multiple equilibria.14 
 
3. Data 
 The empirical analysis uses data for 1979-2004 from the NLSY 1979, which is a 
nationally representative sample of 12,686 young men and women who were 14-22 
years old when they were first surveyed in 1979. These individuals were interviewed 
                                                 
14 One could imagine a scenario where there is a low n/low γ equilibrium and a high n/high γ 
equilibrium. 
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annually until 1994 and are currently interviewed on a biennial basis.15 Like Ahituv 
and Lerman (2005), I dropped the military over-sample and the low-income white 
over-sample, which were discontinued in 1986 and 1991, respectively, and together 
comprise 2,923 individuals. This left a sample of 4,837 males and 4,926 females, 
containing 54,481 male person-year observations and 58,764 female person-year 
observations. 
 The NLSY questionnaire contains detailed information on the timing of past 
changes in marital status, allowing the creation of a complete marital history for each 
person. I consider four marital states: never married, married for the first time, 
remarried and divorced or separated.16 
 The annual earnings and hours worked by a respondent and his/her spouse during 
the year prior to each interview are available and a wage variable was constructed 
from these. For those who did not work in a given year, had missing income or work 
hours data, received self-employment income or had a wage less than $2 or greater 
than $200, I interpolated a wage rate using information on the person’s wage rate in 
previous and future periods. For observations that could not be interpolated, I inserted 
the nearest valid observation.17 All monetary values are expressed in 2000 dollars, 
using the National Income and Product Account price index for personal consumption 
expenditures. 
 Other variables that are used in the labor supply regressions include race/ethnicity; 
                                                 
15 Ahituv and Lerman (2005) were able to construct an annual panel, using the retrospective information 
that was provided by respondents after the switch to biennial surveys. Although this allows the 
construction of complete marital status, work hours and wage series, it is not possible to recover spousal 
characteristics for the missing years. 
16 Separation is grouped with divorce as the predictions discussed in the previous section are driven by 
the division of labor within a shared household, not any legal definition of marriage. Separations that 
last less than a year are ignored in the hazard models in Section 4. 
17 Imputing missing wage observations using ordinary least squares and fixed effects regression models 
instead made little difference to the results presented in the following section. 
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age; highest schooling grade completed; percentile score on the Armed Forces 
Qualification Test (AFQT); family rent, dividend and interest income; region of 
residence; urban status; whether the respondent was born in a foreign country; whether 
the respondent’s health limited the amount of work he/she could perform; number of 
children in household and presence of a child aged under 6 in the household; and the 
local unemployment rate. In addition, an index measuring attitudes towards the roles 
of men and women is constructed from eight questions asked of the respondent during 
the 1982 interview using factor analysis.18 
 Additional variables that are used in the marital transition equations are current 
religion of the respondent and whether he/she attends religious services weekly; 
whether the respondent’s parents separated before age 18; the age a respondent 
expects to get married for the first time, as asked in 1979; actual age at marriage and 
whether the respondent had a child present in the household at the time of marriage. 
 Means for some of the key variables used in the labor supply regressions are 
presented in Table 2.1, including the marital transition hazard rates, which will be 
described in the next section. Each observation here represents a person-year 
combination and the sample is restricted to ages 25 and above. Note that the male 
sample features a considerably higher percentage of never-married observations. This 
is because women tend to marry for the first time at younger ages than men. 
 
 
                                                 
18 The statements the respondents were asked to evaluate on a four-point scale were: “a woman’s place 
is in the home, not in the office or shop”, “a wife who carries out her full family responsibilities doesn’t 
have time for outside employment”, “a working wife feels more useful than one who doesn’t hold a 
job”, “employment of wives leads to more juvenile delinquency”, “employment of both parents is 
necessary to keep up with the high cost of living”, “it is much better for everyone concerned if the man 
is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family”, “men should share 
the work around the house with women, such as doing dishes, cleaning and so forth” and “women are 
much happier if they stay at home and take care of their children”. 
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Table 2.1 
Means for the labour supply equation estimation sample 
 
Variable Females Males 
Annual hours of work 1512.711 2154.311 
Employed 0.848 0.968 
Never married 0.258 0.374 
First marriage 0.534 0.502 
Subsequent marriage 0.051 0.027 
Divorced 0.157 0.097 
Wage 13.105 16.699 
Spouse wage 20.531 13.914 
Non-wage income (in 1000s) 1.274 3.289 
Age 31.004 30.595 
Black non-Hispanic 0.146 0.129 
Hispanic 0.055 0.057 
Highest grade completed 14.006 13.760 
AFQT score 50.210 52.417 
Foreign born 0.035 0.038 
Midwest 0.289 0.331 
South 0.348 0.315 
West 0.169 0.173 
Urban 0.816 0.806 
Local unemployment rate 0.066 0.067 
Number of children 1.237 0.847 
Child under 6 0.416 0.347 
First marriage hazard 0.070 0.070 
First divorce hazard 0.011 0.006 
Subsequent marriage hazard 0.045 0.043 
Subsequent divorce hazard 0.002 0.000 
Number of observations 25,552 22,851 
Notes: Means are calculated using the 1979 sampling weights. 
Wages and incomes are in constant (2000) dollar values, using the personal consumption 
expenditures price index from the National Income and Product Accounts. 
4. Approach and results 
 The primary analysis is concerned with estimating labor supply functions for 
married and unmarried individuals, controlling for the probability of exiting one’s 
current marital state. To facilitate estimation, I linearize Equations 2.37 and 2.39 in 
, twln twln , , tR tR , tη  and tγ  and combine them in a single expression. To allow for 
heterogeneity among individuals, i, I also condition on demographic factors, X, and 
introduce an error term, ε : 
 itjititjitjitjitjitjjit Rwwn εγχηχχχχχ +++++++= πX543210 lnln ; (2.51) 
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 itjititjitjitjitjitjjit Rwwn εγχηχχχχχ +++++++= πX543210 lnln . (2.52) 
The linearized coefficients for women are: 
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where j indexes marital state and   is an indicator function for being married. 
Different specifications of ε will be considered. 
jI
 In all estimates of Equations 2.51 and 2.52 discussed in this section, the dependent 
variable is annual hours of work in the previous year. The imputed log wage and 
family non-wage income are included, along with their interactions with all marital 
states.19 The spouse’s imputed wage is interacted with first and subsequent marriage. 
Additional controls include education, the gender roles index, number of own children 
in household and whether the youngest child was under 6, which are interacted with 
all marital states; spouse education and the age difference between spouses, which are 
interacted with first and subsequent marriages; as well as race/ethnicity, AFQT score, 
urban status, foreign born status, health status, whether attending regular school, and 
                                                 
19 Since I use family income, one would expect the coefficients on the interaction terms to be negative, 
even if the non-wage income elasticity of labor supply was the same for single and married people. 
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the local unemployment rate. In order to focus on those who have completed the 
majority of their schooling, I drop those observations before age 25. 
 Obviously, an individual’s probability of changing marital state is unknown to the 
researcher. One approach is to use as a proxy the divorce rate among people with 
similar characteristics. The June supplement of the Current Population Survey 
contains information on the age of respondents at first marriage and divorce. From the 
1980 supplement, I calculated the proportion of first marriages that end (by divorce or 
widowhood) within ten years for each combination of region, education, race/ethnicity 
and age at marriage category.20 As a measure of marriage, I calculated the fraction of 
people who had married by the age of 30 within region, education, race/ethnicity and 
sex categories. Table 2.2 presents the results of using these estimates as measures of γ 
and η in Equations 2.51 and 2.52. Consistent with the model presented in Section 2, 
the divorce rate is seen to have a significant positive effect on the hours worked by 
women in their first marriage but an insignificant effect on hours for men. 
Furthermore, the marriage rate is positively associated with hours for never-married 
men. However, contrary to the predictions of the model, the marriage rate also has a 
positive impact on the hours worked by never-married women. 
 A problem with these measures of the marital transition probabilities is that they 
do not take account of the specific characteristics of each individual or married couple. 
Furthermore, they do not reflect the ways in which the risk of divorce evolves over the 
course of a marriage. Hence, the results in Table 2.2 only reflect cross-sectional 
differences in divorce likelihood, not inter-temporal variation. Exploiting the 
longitudinal nature of the NLSY, an alternative approach is to use a person’s actual 
experience of divorce in the future. Table 2.3 reports average hours for a sample of 
                                                 
20 I use three education categories (less than Grade 12, Grade 12, at least some college), three 
race/ethnicity categories (white non-Hispanic, black non-Hispanic and Hispanic) and three age at 
marriage categories (15-20, 21-25 and 26 or over). 
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Table 2.2 
Estimates of labour supply equations using CPS divorce and marriage rates 
 
Variable (i) 
OLS 
Females 
(ii) 
Tobit 
Females 
(iii) 
OLS 
Males 
(iv) 
Tobit 
Males 
Never married × marriage rate  728.111*** 
(260.868) 
951.490*** 
(319.759) 
1109.441*** 
(162.087) 
1397.441*** 
(174.744) 
First marriage × divorce rate 428.421*** 
(85.176) 
475.511*** 
(104.041) 
38.092 
(99.968) 
38.043 
(106.661) 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.159 0.013 0.155 0.010 
Number of observations 35,275 35,275 31,052 33,891 
Note: Controls also include own and spouse log wage, non-wage income, own and spouse highest 
grade completed, age difference between spouses, attitude to gender roles, number of children 
and child under 6, all interacted with marital status, plus age, age squared, black non-Hispanic, 
Hispanic, attended school, AFQT score, poor health, foreign born, 3 region dummies, urban, 
local unemployment rate and marital status dummies. 
  Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
divorcing men and women at different times before and after divorce, along with a 
comparison group of non-divorcing people with the same age composition. Among 
women who divorce, annual hours are seen to increase sharply, from 1262 three years 
before the separation to 1619 two years after it. Almost half of this adjustment occurs 
before divorce. In contrast, the comparison group works less in all periods and exhibits 
no pattern over time. Among divorcing men, the situation is less clear. Although there 
is evidence of a spike in hours immediately before and after divorce, these men both 
begin and end the period of analysis working less than the comparison group. 
 To control for other relevant factors that might vary between divorcing and non-
divorcing people, Table 2.4 presents the results of estimating Equations 2.51 and 2.52 
using the actual experience of changes in marital state in the following year as 
measures of γ and η. The results for men are consistent with predictions for all marital 
transitions. For women, there is evidence of increased work hours in the year prior to 
the dissolution of a first marriage. However, there is no evidence of decreased hours 
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Table 2.3 
Average hours of work for divorcing and non-divorcing couples 
 
Year relative to divorce Females Males 
Divorcers Non-divorcers Divorcers Non-divorcers 
-3 1262 1220 1968 2077 
-2 1309 1218 2067 2080 
-1 1348 1220 2075 2079 
0 1425 1221 2107 2084 
1 1579 1219 2215 2086 
2 1619 1216 2018 2073 
Notes: The divorcing sample consists of those who were observed both 3 years before and 2 years 
after their first marriage ended. 
  The non-divorcing sample consists of all individuals in their first marriage who are not 
observed to separate and reflects the age composition of the divorcing sample at a particular 
year relative to divorce. 
  All means are weighted using the 1979 sample weights. 
before first marriage and, in fact, women appear to behave similarly to men by 
working longer hours in the lead-up to a subsequent marriage. 
 As noted by previous authors, future experience of marriage and divorce are poor 
measures of the transition probabilities for two reasons. Firstly, at the time they make 
their labor supply decisions, individuals do not know with certainty that they will 
change marital state. More importantly, past work has found that past hours of work 
are important determinants of divorce, implying that the estimates in Table 2.4 will 
suffer from endogeneity bias. To date, no empirical research has considered marriage 
probabilities, however, in order to isolate the causal effect of divorce risk on labor 
supply, previous United States studies have proxied for the former by using probit 
models to estimate the probability of an individual actually becoming divorced within 
a specified time.21 I take a somewhat different approach and estimate both marriage 
and divorce probabilities using Cox proportional hazard models. These allow non-
parametric estimates of the marital transition probabilities (or hazard rates) at different 
                                                 
21 Johnson and Skinner (1986) used the probability of divorce within three years, a decision which Gray 
(1995) and Sen (2000) both subsequently adopted. 
 34
Table 2.4 
Estimates of labour supply equations using actual marriage and divorce in the 
following year 
 
Variable (i) 
OLS 
Females 
(ii) 
Tobit 
Females 
(iii) 
OLS 
Males 
(iv) 
Tobit 
Males 
Never married × marriage 103.425** 
(41.832) 
127.184*** 
(49.386) 
241.023*** 
(37.060) 
255.418*** 
(39.137) 
First marriage × divorce 91.579* 
(47.468) 
118.957** 
(56.134) 
-104.571** 
(52.713) 
-108.845* 
(55.661) 
Divorced × remarriage 82.131* 
(49.321) 
117.040** 
(58.179) 
182.984*** 
(57.715) 
187.726*** 
(60.986) 
Subsequent marriage × divorce 89.761 
(91.993) 
135.520 
(108.486) 
-224.305** 
(108.091) 
-241.696** 
(114.261) 
R-squared 0.166 0.014 0.152 0.011 
Number of observations 43,247 43,247 38,484 38,484 
Note: Controls also include own and spouse log wage, non-wage income, own and spouse highest 
grade completed, age difference between spouses, attitude to gender roles, number of children 
and child under 6, all interacted with marital status, plus age, age squared, black non-Hispanic, 
Hispanic, attended school, AFQT score, poor health, foreign born, 3 region dummies, urban, 
local unemployment rate and marital status dummies. 
  Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
lengths of time in the current marital state. In contrast, previous authors have typically 
treated years since marriage in a parametric manner by including it as a quadratic term 
in the divorce probit equations. 
 The Cox model assumes that the hazard rate can be written as: 
 , (2.59) zβz ethth )(),( 0=
where β is a vector of coefficients, z is a vector of covariates and  is the hazard 
when , termed the baseline hazard function. Differences in covariates result in 
proportional shifts of the hazard rate. An exponentiated coefficient, , is referred to 
as a hazard ratio and its magnitude relative to 1 determines whether the covariate in 
question increases or decreases the hazard rate. 
)(0 th
ie β
0z =
 Table 2.5 presents the results of hazard models for the probability of divorce 
occurring among married people. The explanatory variables that are used follow 
previous economic and demographic studies. I estimate separate models for men and 
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Table 2.5 
Hazard ratios from Cox proportional hazard model estimates for the probability of 
divorce 
 
Variable (i) 
Females – 
first divorce 
(ii) 
Females – 
subsequent 
divorce 
(iii) 
Males – first 
divorce 
(iv) 
Males – 
subsequent 
divorce 
Age at marriage 0.899*** 0.815*** 0.870*** 0.691*** 
Age difference 1.005 0.952 1.014 1.135** 
Black non-Hispanic 1.674*** 2.200 1.664*** 16.236*** 
Hispanic 1.127 0.749 0.604** 1.051 
Catholic 0.637** 0.731 1.067 0.352 
Baptist 0.939 0.693 1.055 0.215** 
Other protestant 0.821 0.897 0.922 0.343 
Frequency of religious attendance 0.805* 0.835 0.726** 0.104** 
Poor health 1.142 1.591 1.534 – 
Highest grade completed 0.994 0.987 0.900*** 0.995 
AFQT score 0.990*** 0.997 0.997 0.997 
Spouse income (in 1000s) 0.998 1.009** 0.992 0.958 
Non-wage income (in 1000s) 0.9998 0.499 1.010 1.000 
Parents divorced 1.190 0.819 1.608*** 0.792 
Urban 1.167 0.629 1.543** 0.489 
Child present 0.957 0.399 0.573*** 2.689 
Child before marriage 1.520*** 2.415 1.737*** 0.129** 
Number of observations 17,993 2,112 16,037 1,267 
Number of individuals 2,125 453 2,033 314 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  Coefficients and standard errors are presented in Table A1. 
  Poor health was not included in the fourth specification as none of the men who were within 
twelve months of their second divorce had health limitations. 
women and for exit from first marriage and exit from subsequent marriages. In all 
cases, individuals who marry at older ages are less likely to divorce. Non-Hispanic 
blacks, those who attend religious services weekly and those with children in the 
household at time of marriage are more likely to exit first marriages. Among women 
in their first marriages, Catholics and those with high AFQT scores also tend to have 
lower divorce hazards; for men, being Hispanic, not experiencing divorce as a child, 
living in a metropolitan area and having dependent children in the household all 
reduce the chances of exiting a first marriage. These results are broadly consistent
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Figure 2.4 
Kernel plots of average divorce hazards 
with those of hazard model analyses of divorce, such as Balakrishnan et al. (1987) and 
Castro Martin and Bumpass (1989). 
  Figure 2.4 depicts the hazard rates for men and women in their first marriage and 
women in subsequent marriages, where all explanatory variables are set equal to their 
means. The hazard function for men in subsequent marriages is not presented as it is 
implausibly high, presumably because so few remarried men are observed during the 
sample period. The average woman is more likely to divorce than an average man who 
has been married for the same time. This is because the wives of the men in the NLSY 
sample earn more than the married women in the sample and spousal income has a 
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Table 2.6 
Hazard ratios from Cox proportional hazard model estimates for the probability of 
marriage and remarriage 
 
Variable (i) 
Females – 
first marriage 
(ii) 
Females – 
subsequent 
marriage 
(iii) 
Males – first 
marriage 
(iv) 
Males – 
subsequent 
marriage 
Black non-Hispanic 0.532*** 0.288*** 0.520*** 0.559** 
Hispanic 0.908 1.053 0.962 1.341 
Catholic 0.962 0.575*** 0.789*** 0.876 
Baptist 1.048 0.987 0.973 1.138 
Other protestant 0.948 1.051 0.867** 1.207 
Frequency of religious attendance 1.134*** 1.188 1.147*** 1.302 
Poor health 0.967 0.511* 0.925 1.028 
Highest grade completed 0.931*** 1.048 0.953*** 1.151** 
AFQT score 1.001 0.999 1.003** 0.998 
Non-wage income (in 1000s) 1.012** 0.977 0.9997 0.974 
Parents divorced 0.915 0.913 0.924 0.751 
Urban 0.863*** 0.903 0.835*** 0.718 
Child present 0.766*** 0.558*** 1.205* 1.099 
Expected marriage age 0.749*** 0.770*** 0.819*** 0.879 
Number of observations 28,345 5,885 33,323 3,546 
Number of individuals 3,393 1,177 3,565 823 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  Coefficients and standard errors are presented in Table A2. 
negative effect on the divorce hazard.22 The hazard rates peak between four and five 
years after marriage. Remarried women are less likely to divorce than women in their 
first marriage. 
 I also estimate hazard models for entry into marriage and the results of these are 
presented in Table 2.6. For entry into first marriage, age 15 was chosen as the origin 
because the minimum legal age for marriage without a court order (but with parental 
consent) in most states is 16.23 Non-Hispanic blacks are seen to be less likely to marry 
or remarry. More educated and less devout persons, city-dwellers and those who 
expected to marry later are all less likely to marry at a given age. Interestingly, the 
                                                 
22 If the average incomes among married men and women in the sample are used as the spousal incomes 
for the opposite sex, the two first divorce lines in Figure 2.4 overlap almost exactly. 
23 91 women and 5 men in the NLSY dataset married before age 15, which in most states would require 
a court order in addition to parental consent. These observations are excluded from the analysis in Table 
2.3. 
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presence of a child in the household decreases the likelihood of a woman marrying, 
but increases the likelihood of a man marrying. Having considerable non-wage 
income renders a woman more likely to marry. Among men, being Catholic or 
Protestant other than Baptist and having a higher AFQT score are associated with a 
higher probability of marriage. Again, these results largely agree with those of 
previous studies of marriage and remarriage, such as Michael and Brandon Tuma 
(1985) and Koo et al. (1984). 
 The average marriage hazard functions for the four cases are plotted in Figure 2.5. 
Not surprisingly, women are more likely than men to marry at younger ages. The 
probability of marriage is highest at age 24 for women and 25 for men. The 
probability of remarriage peaks four years after divorce, with men being more likely to 
remarry rapidly. 
 Estimates of marriage and divorce probabilities for each person-year observation 
(η and γ in the model presented in Section 2) are obtained from the hazard models in 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 by computing the baseline hazard and multiplying it by the 
exponentiated linear prediction, as in Equation 2.59. These predicted probabilities are 
then interacted with the appropriate marital state (never married, first marriage, 
divorced or subsequent marriage) and are used as regressors in labor supply 
regressions, as reported in Table 2.7. Other than the marital transition probabilities, the 
specification is the same as in Tables 2.2 and 2.4. 
 Ordinary least squares estimates are presented in the first and third columns of 
Table 2.7 and tobit estimates are reported in the second and fourth columns. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are computed for the marital transition probability 
variables, to correct for prediction error in the first-stage hazard estimates. The regular 
and bootstrapped standard errors are expected to form lower and upper bounds on the 
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Kernel plots of average marriage hazards 
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true standard error, respectively.24 The reported wage and non-wage income 
elasticities are generally as expected. Women have higher wage elasticities than men 
in the same marital state and the elasticities for married men are actually negative. The 
hours worked by a married woman are more responsive to her spouse’s wage rate than 
is the case for a married man. Although unreported, the coefficients on the gender 
                                                 
24 As Johnson and Skinner (1986) noted, since individuals do not know whether they will change 
marital status in the following year at the time they make their labor supply decisions, the regular 
standard errors are only biased to the extent that the person’s subjective probability explains more than 
the predicted hazard rate. To that end, the regular standard errors will be correct if the individual has no 
more knowledge than the econometrician, while the bootstrapped standard errors will be correct if the 
individual has perfect knowledge of changes in marital status in the following year. 
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Table 2.7 
Estimates of labour supply equations using estimated marriage and divorce hazard rates 
 
 
Variable (i) 
OLS 
Females 
(ii) 
Tobit 
Females 
(iii) 
OLS 
Males 
(iv) 
Tobit 
Males 
Log wage 232.331*** 288.858*** 
(23.086) 
8.436 
(14.968) 
22.998*** 
(19.255) (15.689) 
First marriage × log 
wage 
-134.011*** 
(23.409) 
-127.967*** 
(27.992) 
-263.405*** 
(21.238) 
-275.269*** 
(15.689) 
Divorced × log wage -299.806*** 
(28.148) 
-324.848*** 
(33.516) 
-210.226*** 
(29.521) 
-214.159*** 
(30.903) 
Subsequent marriage × 
log wage 
-359.147*** 
(43.716) 
-392.550*** 
(51.926) 
-656.617*** 
(64.803) 
-672.271*** 
(67.724) 
First marriage × spouse 
log wage 
-287.461*** 
(15.254) 
-356.379*** 
(18.300) 
56.833*** 
(15.029) 
56.127*** 
(15.669) 
Subsequent marriage × 
spouse log wage 
-111.358** 
(49.331) 
-133.309** 
(58.917) 
159.622** 
(70.687) 
165.418*** 
(73.891) 
Non-wage income (in 
1000s) 
-5.684 
(3.599) 
-7.089 
(4.198) 
0.076 
(0.046) 
0.079 
(0.048) 
First marriage × non-
wage income 
5.585 
(3.600) 
0.605 
(4.386) 
3.672*** 
(1.026) 
3.638*** 
(1.069) 
Divorced × non-wage 
income 
0.435 
(3.936) 
-0.958 
(4.815) 
-0.042 
(0.080) 
-0.044 
(0.083) 
Subsequent marriage × 
non-wage income 
-25.180*** 
(9.648) 
-35.874*** 
(12.551) 
5.031 
(5.955) 
4.579 
(6.217) 
First marriage 1668.640*** 
(109.995) 
1919.989*** 
(131.512) 
1131.001*** 
(98.711) 
1204.453*** 
(103.100) 
Divorced 722.850*** 
(124.596) 
777.278*** 
(148.525) 
219.028* 
(131.024) 
228.647* 
(137.263) 
Subsequent marriage 1379.896*** 
(234.812) 
1518.297*** 
(278.954) 
1317.643*** 
(322.318) 
1355.084*** 
(336.781) 
Never married × 
marriage probability 
3853.004*** 
(406.330) 
[571.646] 
4351.235*** 
(481.015) 
[496.046] 
2169.397*** 
(347.241) 
[398.320] 
2327.388*** 
(362.908) 
[493.808] 
First marriage × divorce 
probability 
4715.265** 
(868.814) 
[2389.004] 
5549.014** 
(1033.088) 
[2226.549] 
-2337.963 
(1599.488) 
[2521.332] 
-2207.696 
(1670.289) 
[3353.317] 
Divorced × remarriage 
probability 
800.133 
(412.886) 
[891.338] 
1007.502 
(485.436) 
[1122.255] 
460.906 
(664.842) 
[1643.534] 
521.291*** 
(694.478) 
[1394.518] 
Subsequent marriage × 
divorce probability 
-12549.440 
(9531.438) 
7.18 × 106 7.12 × 106 -16737.690 
(5.13 × 106) (5.53 × 106) (11553.330) 
[7.05 × 106] [4.48 × 105] [5.67 × 1011] [1.10 × 109] 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.208 0.017 0.151 0.011 
Number of observations 25,552 25,552 22,851 22,851 
Notes: Controls also include own and spouse highest grade completed, age difference between spouses, 
attitude to gender roles, number of children and child under 6, all interacted with marital status, 
plus age, age squared, black non-Hispanic, Hispanic, attended school, AFQT score, poor health, 
foreign born, 3 region dummies, urban, local unemployment rate and marital status dummies. 
  Standard errors are presented in parentheses and bootstrapped standard errors in brackets. *, ** 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, and refer to the 
bootstrap distribution where it is reported. 
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roles attitude variables indicate that conservative women tend to work less than other 
women in all marital states, however conservative men also have slightly lower hours 
before and during first marriage, compared to other men. 
 Consistent with the predictions of the theory, higher probabilities of divorce are 
found to increase the hours worked by women in their first marriage, but to decrease 
the hours worked by men, although the latter relationship is statistically insignificant. 
Higher probabilities of first marriage are associated with more work hours among both 
men and women. The latter result is somewhat puzzling. One possible explanation is 
that a woman’s marginal utility with respect to her hours is not constant over the life-
cycle but rather is higher when divorced than when never married. The transition 
probabilities for those who have been divorced at least once are insignificant. As 
mentioned above, this may be because there are relatively few observations in 
divorced or remarried states or because after experiencing one divorce, people become 
less responsive to further changes in marital transition probabilities. 
 Unlike all previous studies, since I have a full panel for all individuals over the 
sample period, as they move between marital states, I can also employ panel data 
models. The first and third columns of Table 2.8 report the results of applying a fixed 
effects, or within, estimator to Equations 2.51 and 2.52, which controls for all 
unobserved time-invariant determinants of labor supply. The marriage probability 
continues to have a positive effect on hours for both sexes, as does the divorce 
probability for women.25 These estimates imply that married women allocate labor 
supply optimally over their lifetimes in response to changes in probability of marital 
dissolution. The second and fourth columns of Table 2.8 give the results from the 
between estimator, whereby the observations are averaged over all periods for each 
individual. There is evidence that women from high divorce risk groups work more 
                                                 
25 A Hausman test rejected the hypothesis that a random effects estimator is consistent. 
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Table 2.8 
Within and between estimates of labour supply equations using estimated marriage and 
divorce hazard rates 
 
Variable (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Within Between Within Between 
Females Females Males Males 
Never married × 
marriage probability 
647.993 4393.990*** 2114.120*** 2461.066*** 
(458.777) (1062.648) (389.467) (939.086) 
[476.179] [844.922] [490.4969] [1035.315] 
First marriage × divorce 
probability 
2272.232 7293.940*** 3573.985 -3578.060 
(1030.905) (2134.298) (2335.473) (3538.877) 
[1797.585] [2549.522] [2342.904] [2680.563] 
Divorced × remarriage 
probability 
401.439 432.944 839.556 1850.282 
(459.915) (844.118) (663.519) (1445.243) 
[959.295] [1174.655] [1452.954] [2774.321] 
1.01 × 107 -1.90 × 106 Subsequent marriage × 
divorce probability 
-20496.950 -32659.990 
(6.17 × 106) (9.01 × 106) (12649.300) (16047.020) 
[1.43 × 106] [3.52 × 106] [3.54 × 1011] [2.59 × 1011] 
R-squared 0.534 0.383 0.480 0.286 
Number of observations 25,552 25,552 22,851 23,963 
Notes: Controls also include own and spouse log wage, non-wage income, own and spouse highest 
grade completed, age difference between spouses, attitude to gender roles, number of children 
and child under 6, all interacted with marital status, plus age, age squared, black non-Hispanic, 
Hispanic, attended school, AFQT score, poor health, foreign born, 3 region dummies, urban, 
local unemployment rate and marital status dummies. 
  Standard errors are presented in parentheses and bootstrapped standard errors in brackets. *, ** 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, and refer to the 
bootstrap distribution where it is reported. 
over the entire duration of their marriages, regardless of the specific danger of their 
own relationship ending. This casts doubt on the approach of Johnson and Skinner 
(1988), who analyzed the reasons behind labor supply increases by women after 
divorce by comparing hours two and three years prior to separation and one and two 
years afterwards. 
 The identification of the coefficients on the marriage and divorce probabilities in 
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 depends crucially on the exclusion of variables from the labor 
supply equation that are relevant to the likelihood of marriage or divorce occurring.26 
Given the absence of any clearly exogenous shocks to the marriage and divorce 
                                                 
26 Technically, the non-linear nature of Cox proportional hazard model is sufficient to identify the labor 
supply equation. 
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Table 2.9 
Estimates of labour supply equations using marital happiness variable 
 
Variable (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Tobit Within Tobit with lags Within with lags 
Females Females Females Females 
First marriage × happy 
with marriage 
-56.811* -37.418 -92.178*** -120.964*** 
(30.459) (28.007) (31.475) (28.464) 
First marriage × unhappy 
with marriage 
120.970 69.710 191.032** 70.554 
(81.380) (63.801) (85.995) (68.040) 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.012 0.468 0.012 0.487 
Number of observations 21,946 21,946 18,423 18,423 
Notes: Controls also include own and spouse log wage, non-wage income, own and spouse highest 
grade completed, age difference between spouses, attitude to gender roles, number of children 
and child under 6, all interacted with marital status, plus age, age squared, black non-Hispanic, 
Hispanic, attended school, AFQT score, poor health, foreign born, 3 region dummies, urban, 
local unemployment rate and marital status dummies. 
  Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
equations, there is a risk that some of these variables have an independent effect on 
labor supply. For example, Heineck (2004) found that strongly religious married 
women tend to work less than other married women in Germany. An alternative 
approach that has not been considered previously is to rely on a respondent’s own 
evaluation of the state of his/her marriage. This has two advantages over the use of 
predicted divorce. Firstly, it allows the identification of individuals who anticipate 
divorces that never transpire and vice versa. Secondly, if satisfaction with marriage is 
evaluated in the same period as hours, it circumvents the problem of reverse causality 
encountered when using divorce in the future as a measure of divorce risk. However, 
estimates may still be susceptible to endogeneity bias if marital satisfaction and work 
hours are jointly determined by unobserved variables. 
 The NLSY includes questions on whether respondents were “very happy”, “fairly 
happy” or “not too happy” with their current marriage. Unfortunately, these were only 
asked of women in 1992 and 1994 onwards. Table 2.9 presents the results of 
estimating Equation 2.51 for these years only. The measures of divorce risk are the 
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interaction of first marriage with a dummy for those who responded that they were 
“very happy” with their marriage and those who responded that they were “not too 
happy”. The first two columns of Table 2.9 reveal that those who are unhappy with 
their marriage are found to work longer hours that the baseline group, whereas those 
who are very happy work less, however these results are only marginally significant. 
Once problem is that marital satisfaction is measured as of the interview date, whereas 
hours of work pertain to the previous calendar year, meaning that endogeneity may 
still be a problem. A simple solution is to use the level of marital satisfaction from two 
years earlier, as this should be exogenous to the current labor supply decision. The 
third column of Table 2.9 shows that this yields highly significant results. Those who 
are very happy with their marriage work 92 hours fewer than the comparison group; 
those who are unhappy work 191 hours more. The former result remains when 
individual effects are included, as seen in the final column. 
 Finally, it should be remembered that the labor supply equations 2.51 and 2.52 are 
linear approximations to the first order conditions that arise from the theoretical 
model. With higher order approximations, one would expect to find interactions of the 
marital transition probabilities with own and spouse wages. To examine this 
possibility, I repeat the main specifications from Table 2.7, adding the log ratio of a 
married woman’s wage to her husband’s wage as a regressor. As reported in Table 
2.10, this ratio has a significant coefficient for women and a positive coefficient for 
men, although the former is not significant under the bootstrap distribution. These 
results imply that as a woman’s wage increases towards parity with her husband, the 
risk of divorce has an increasingly small effect on her hours of work. They also 
suggest that divorce risk can play an important role in the work decisions of those men 
who earn lower wages than their wives. This finding supports the conclusions of the 
model presented in Section 2 insofar as it indicates that the differences in the labor 
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Table 2.10 
Estimates of labour supply equations including the wage ratio 
 
Variable (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit 
Females Females Males Males 
Never married × 
marriage probability 
3866.611*** 4371.149*** 2202.906*** 2358.891*** 
(406.379) (481.052) (347.209) (362.865) 
[507.181] [563.448] [590.796] [561.397] 
First marriage × divorce 
probability 
4120.986** 4774.081** -3394.193 -3194.028 
(935.148) (1107.809) (1618.850) (1689.947) 
[2033.541] [1955.054] [4574.468] [4221.708] 
Divorced × remarriage 
probability 
805.874 1016.107 509.345 566.841 
(412.839) (485.367) (664.684) (694.288) 
[1016.250] [1321.819] [2015.533] [1377.602] 
1.47 × 107 1.52 × 107 Subsequent marriage × 
divorce probability 
15266.870 8626.519 
(6.63 × 106) (6.91 × 106) (13720.240) (16647.000) 
[1.32 × 106] [4.31 × 105] [2.66 × 1011] [1.90 × 109] 
First marriage × divorce 
probability × log wage 
ratio 
-1634.365 -2155.463 7432.218*** 7014.738*** 
(866.219) (1039.357) (1798.833) (1881.019) 
[1725.132] [2072.967] [2778.138] [2770.711] 
-2.05 × 107 -2.24 × 107 Subsequent marriage × 
divorce probability × log 
wage ratio 
23122.350** 20495.020* 
(1.16 × 107) (1.22 × 107) (8206.426) (9748.456) 
[1.91 × 107] [1.88 × 107] [9497.462] [11915.820] 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.209 0.017 0.152 0.011 
Number of observations 25,552 25,552 22,851 22,851 
Notes: Controls also include own and spouse log wage, non-wage income, own and spouse highest 
grade completed, age difference between spouses, attitude to gender roles, number of children 
and child under 6, all interacted with marital status, plus age, age squared, black non-Hispanic, 
Hispanic, attended school, AFQT score, poor health, foreign born, 3 region dummies, urban, 
local unemployment rate and marital status dummies. 
  Standard errors are presented in parentheses and bootstrapped standard errors in brackets. *, ** 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, and refer to the 
bootstrap distribution where it is reported. 
supply-divorce risk relationship hinge solely on the assumption that men earn more 
than women, rather than any specific gender roles within the household. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 For the first time, this paper has attempted to provide a theoretical framework to 
explain the relationship between the probability of a person changing marital state and 
the amount of labor he/she supplies over the life-cycle. Married couples interact in a 
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non-cooperative fashion. Working longer hours in the labor market increases the wage 
a person will receive in the future, meaning that some married individuals may want to 
insure against the risk of divorce by devoting more time to paid work than they would 
otherwise do. The model predicts that labor supply will be positively related to the 
probability of divorce for a person who earns a lower wage than his/her spouse and 
vice versa. 
 I tested the predictions of this model, drawing on longitudinal data from the NLSY 
1979. Marriage and divorce probabilities were estimated using Cox proportional 
hazard models. These were then used as explanatory variables in labor supply 
regressions. As expected, married women work more hours when the probability they 
will divorce is higher. However, this effect only seems to hold for first marriages. 
Never-married men and women both work more if they have a greater chance of 
marriage. This last finding is intriguing and will be analyzed further in future work. 
The link between marital transition probabilities and hours is observed both over a 
person’s life-cycle and across individuals and persists when arguably exogenous 
measures of divorce risk are used. There is also some evidence that the effect of 
divorce risk on hours is stronger for women who earn significantly less than their 
husbands. 
 Additional research will also explicitly consider whether work hours influence 
divorce probabilities, i.e. whether there is an additional causal effect in the reverse 
direction. Gray (1995) and Sen (2002) found no evidence of this using NLSY 1979 
data, however Johnson (2004) provided evidence suggesting that the work hours of 
women in the Survey of Income and Program Participation have an independent effect 
on the likelihood of divorce.27 
                                                 
27 Johnson’s conclusion was based on the assumption that married people are less likely to adjust their 
work hours in anticipation of separation rather than actual divorce. 
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 Finally, future work will focus on the predictions of the theory, comparing the 
Nash equilibrium results that are generated for married couples with the Pareto 
efficient outcomes and determining whether these might be achieved within a 
cooperative bargaining framework. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Table 2.A1 
Coefficients from Cox proportional hazard model estimates for the probability of 
divorce 
 
Variable (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Females – 
first divorce 
Females – 
subsequent 
divorce 
Males – first 
divorce 
Males – 
subsequent 
divorce 
Age at marriage -0.107*** -0.204*** -0.139*** -0.369*** 
(0.018) (0.059) (0.022) (0.126) 
Age difference 0.005 -0.049 0.014 0.126** 
(0.015) (0.034) (0.020) (0.068) 
Black non-Hispanic 0.515*** 0.788 0.509*** 2.787*** 
(0.156) (0.623) (0.194) (0.874) 
Hispanic 0.120 -0.289 -0.504** 0.050 
(0.189) (0.659) (0.217) (0.917) 
Catholic -0.450** -0.314 0.065 -1.044 
(0.180) (0.674) (0.200) (0.890) 
Baptist -0.063 -0.366 0.054 -1.537** 
(0.158) (0.568) (0.188) (0.839) 
Other protestant -0.197 -0.109 -0.081 -1.069 
(0.179) (0.604) (0.210) (0.849) 
Frequency of religious attendance -0.217* -0.181 -0.320** -2.261** 
(0.118) (0.458) (0.156) (0.974) 
Poor health 0.132 0.465 0.428 – 
(0.250) (0.638) (0.342) 
Highest grade completed -0.006 -0.014 -0.105*** -0.005 
(0.031) (0.116) (0.038) (0.224) 
AFQT score -0.010*** -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
(0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.016) 
Spouse income (in 1000s) -0.002 0.009** -0.008 -0.043 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.030) 
Non-wage income (in 1000s) 0.000 -0.696 0.010 0.000 
(0.001) (0.635) (0.007) (0.071) 
Parents divorced 0.174 -0.199 0.475*** -0.233 
(0.136) (0.459) (0.158) (0.732) 
Urban 0.155 -0.463 0.434** -0.715 
(0.137) (0.460) (0.172) (0.822) 
Child present -0.044 -0.919 -0.557*** -2.045 
(0.159) (0.730) (0.173) (0.973) 
Child before marriage 0.419*** 0.882 0.552*** 0.989** 
(0.138) (0.673) (0.155) (0.754) 
Number of observations 17,993 2,112 16,037 1,267 
Number of individuals 2,125 453 2,033 314 
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
  Poor health was not included in the fourth specification as none of the men who were within 
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Table 2.A2 
Coefficients from Cox proportional hazard model estimates for the probability of 
marriage and remarriage 
 
Variable (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Females – 
first marriage 
Females – 
subsequent 
marriage 
Males – first 
marriage 
Males – 
subsequent 
marriage 
Black non-Hispanic -0.630*** -1.247*** -0.654*** -0.582** 
(0.068) (0.247) (0.068) (0.285) 
Hispanic -0.097 0.029 -0.039 0.294 
(0.065) (0.200) (0.066) (0.292) 
Catholic -0.039 -0.527** -0.237*** -0.132 
(0.064) (0.209) (0.063) (0.289) 
Baptist 0.047 -0.017 -0.027 0.129 
(0.068) (0.212) (0.069) (0.284) 
Other protestant -0.053 0.047 -0.143** 0.188 
(0.067) (0.193) (0.067) (0.308) 
Frequency of religious attendance 0.126*** 0.187 0.137*** 0.264 
(0.044) (0.209) (0.048) (0.204) 
Poor health -0.034 -0.675* -0.078 0.027 
(0.108) (0.387) (0.123) (0.424) 
Highest grade completed -0.071*** 0.046 -0.048*** 0.140** 
(0.011) (0.040) (0.011) (0.055) 
AFQT score 0.001 -0.001 0.003** -0.002 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) 
Non-wage income (in 1000s) 0.012** -0.023 0.000 -0.027 
(0.006) (0.027) (0.001) (0.037) 
Parents divorced -0.089 -0.091 -0.079 -0.287 
(0.055) (0.169) (0.060) (0.275) 
Urban -0.148*** -0.091 -0.180*** -0.331 
(0.051) (0.169) (0.052) (0.228) 
Child present -0.266*** -0.596*** 0.186** 0.095 
(0.065) (0.146) (0.104) (0.228) 
Expected marriage age -0.289*** -0.264*** -0.200*** -0.129 
(0.030) (0.062) (0.029) (0.084) 
Number of observations 28,345 5,885 33,323 4,430 
Number of individuals 3,393 1,177 3,565 991 
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
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3. The dynamics of productivity spillovers in Major 
League Baseball 
 
“A horse never runs so fast as when he has other horses to catch up and outpace.” 
OVID 
 
 One labor market where productivity spillovers clearly exist between co-workers 
is that for professional team sports. Output is directly related to team performance, 
which is likely to be a complex function of the output of individual players. With 
salary data for individual players and information on the teams they play for over their 
careers, it is possible to assess the extent to which the performance of a player’s team-
mates affects his/her income, after controlling for the player’s own performance. The 
major benefit of studying the labor market for sportsmen is that detailed measures of 
individual productivity are easily obtained, rather than simply the crude proxies of 
education and experience that are typically used in studies of the general labor market. 
This allows one to accurately measure the contributions to team output made by 
individual players. 
 Although baseball is a team sport, it has a large set of well-defined individual 
performance statistics, making it an ideal setting in which to untangle the contributions 
of individual and team productivity to a player’s salary. Team performance is unlikely 
to have much effect on salary after controlling for individual performance measures 
for precisely this reason; general managers are able to observe a person’s “numbers” 
in each season. However, this does not imply that team-mates have no effect on a 
player’s earnings since they may influence his individual statistics, which are certain 
to be related to pay. 
 A player’s performance may be influenced by the performance of his team-mates 
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in two ways. Firstly, his individual statistics may be “inflated” by the presence of 
highly productive players on his team in the same season. For example, a player’s 
batting average is likely to improve if he hits before a slugger in the order. This type 
of effect is a true spillover, in the sense that it does not increase the person’s true 
ability and is purely transitory – if the slugger were to leave the team, his team-mates 
would suffer a fall in their averages. In contrast, if players learn from their team-
mates, they will play better in future seasons, regardless of where they are and who 
they play alongside. These two effects can be distinguished empirically by looking at 
whether a player’s performance measures are influenced by his team-mates’ 
performance in the same season or in previous seasons. Evidence of the former 
indicates the existence of spillovers; evidence of the latter indicates that learning takes 
place. Few previous studies have focused on whether co-worker spillovers are lasting 
or not since labor economists rarely have accurate, time-varying measures of 
individual productivity. 
 In this paper, the determinants of the performance and incomes of Major League 
Baseball players are examined. Firstly, regressions for a number of individual 
performance statistics are used to explore whether there is evidence of either spillovers 
or learning by either pitchers or position players. Secondly, salary is regressed on 
individual performance measures, thus providing an indication of how much a given 
change in team performance will influence individual salaries in the future. 
Longitudinal data are used, allowing unobserved player-specific heterogeneity and 
team-specific heterogeneity may also be controlled for. Few previous studies have 
analyzed longitudinal baseball data and none of these have looked at productivity 
spillovers or have allowed for team effects in a salary regression. 
  Evidence of both spillovers and learning is uncovered. For example, among 
pitchers earned run average (ERA) is positively related to both contemporaneous 
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team-mate ERA and lagged team-mate ERA. A batter’s average will be higher if his 
team-mates’ averages are high in the previous season only. Salary is found to be 
closely tied to individual performance and hence, indirectly, to team performance. 
 Even though the baseball labor market is a highly atypical one, the results of this 
paper have wider implications within labor economics, since they provide a rare 
insight into the ways in which people’s output (rather than income) is influenced by 
their colleagues. Some of this is due to pure spillovers and is fleeting, however there is 
also evidence that people make lasting productivity gains when they have high-
performing co-workers. These results suggest that the contributions of co-worker 
ability may be easily overlooked in other settings, since even if co-worker ability is 
found to have little effect on earnings after controlling for individual human capital, it 
may operate indirectly from year to year through individual ability. 
 
1. Previous work 
 Rosen and Sanderson (2000) reviewed the main issues in the analysis of labor 
markets for professional sportsmen. They noted that the marginal revenue product of a 
player is the extra price that a spectator is willing to pay multiplied by the number of 
people who are attracted in person or on television. They suggested that the audience-
quality gradient is very steep while the price-quality gradient is very flat. This means 
that top players earn extremely high salaries because they attract the largest audience. 
Rosen (1981) formalized this argument with a production function similar to those 
used by Lucas (1978) and Rosen (1982) in the study of managerial pay within firms. 
 One of the few papers that have directly examined the effect of team performance 
on individual players’ salaries is Idson and Kahane (2000), who focused on the 
National Hockey League. They used the following specification for salaries: 
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where xi is a set of individual performance measures, ix  is the corresponding set of 
team performance measures and zi represents additional regressors. The marginal 
effects of individual and team performance are then given by: 
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 The inclusion of an interaction term in Equation 3.1 therefore means that team 
performance may not only have a direct effect on pay (β2) but also an indirect effect, 
by altering the rate at which individual productive characteristics are valued (β3). The 
sign on β3 determines whether particular inputs are complements (β3 > 0) or 
substitutes (β3 < 0) in production. 
 Idson and Kahane focused on a relatively small cross-section constructed from two 
seasons of data. Along with average player attributes for each team, they included 
performance measures for the team’s coach in ix . Overall, they found that the team 
measures have both a direct and indirect effect on pay. Players tend to be complements 
in production, although there is no uniform pattern across the productive attributes 
used. Coaching quality is found to have a significant effect, although the results suffer 
from multicollinearity between the chosen variables. 
 Among previous papers that have addressed aspects of earnings functions in Major 
League Baseball, Kahn (1993) examined the impact of the introduction of free agency 
and salary arbitration in 1976 on salary and contract duration.1 He used a four-year 
longitudinal dataset covering almost all major league players, with earlier information 
for those on long-term contracts. Fixed effects regressions were estimated separately 
                                                 
1 Kahn (2000) presented a discussion of the emergence of free agency in baseball. 
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for both pitchers and non-pitchers, with the unit of observation being a contract for an 
individual player. Kahn found that both arbitration and free agency eligibility 
increased salary and the latter also increased contract duration. 
 In another paper, Kahn (1993a) investigated the effect of managerial quality on 
team and individual performance. The measures of managerial quality and 
performance used were predicted pay based on regressions that controlled for 
productivity characteristics, while team performance was a team’s winning 
percentage.2 Kahn found that better managers produce better team performances, after 
controlling for player inputs. In addition, higher-quality managers tend to yield 
improvements in player performance, relative to previous levels. 
Blass (1992) examined whether major league baseball players are paid in a manner 
that is consistent with the human capital model, which predicts that incomes rise with 
experience only because of productivity increases. To obtain a measure of productivity 
for each player, he first estimated winning percentage as a function of runs scored and 
conceded and then estimated team revenue as a function of wins. Individual 
productivity was calculated using the estimated coefficients from these equations. 
Blass then included this term in an earnings function, along with experience terms.3 
The fact that experience is found to have a significant effect on pay independent from 
productivity is interpreted as evidence that the major league baseball labor market 
violates the human capital model. Blass instead suggested that an implicit contract 
model may apply, since older players are overpaid, relative to younger players. 
 Using two seasons of data, MacDonald and Reynolds (1994) took a similar 
approach to Blass and found that experienced players paid in accordance with their 
                                                 
2 A drawback of Kahn’s analysis was that, although he used a panel to examine the effects of 
managerial quality, his salary regressions were based only on a single year of data. 
3 Blass used both a cross-sectional earnings equation for all players and an eight-year panel for more 
experienced players only. 
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marginal revenue products, while younger players are paid less than their marginal 
products. They also provided the first empirical support for Rosen’s (1981) model, 
with their results suggesting that returns to talent are convex. 
 Further evidence was reported by Fields (2001), who found that all Major League 
Baseball players are paid less than their marginal revenue products, but, as noted by 
MacDonald and Reynolds, older players receive salaries closer to their marginal 
products than younger players.4 Fields followed a similar two-stage method for 
calculating marginal revenue product as Blass and MacDonald and Reynolds, first 
regressing team revenue on winning percentage and then regressing winning 
percentage on team performance measures. This approach requires the assumption that 
individual performance generates no externalities, so that team performance is the 
summation of individual performance. Fields then examined the relationship between 
players’ salaries and estimated marginal revenue products in a simple regression. This 
paper was one of the first to use a panel of individual salary information and used a 
similar (but shorter) dataset to the one described below. Since his main regressions 
were at the team level, he was able to include team and year effects, however he failed 
to fully exploit the panel aspect of the data by including player effects in his 
individual-level regressions. 
 
2. Data 
A detailed longitudinal dataset was assembled from the Baseball Archive (Version 
5.1) website. This data source contains annual data for every player over the entire 
history of the major leagues, however for the purposes of this study, a dataset was 
                                                 
4 Earlier work by Sommers and Quinton (1982) followed a similar approach and found that the first 
wave of free agents received salaries similar to their marginal revenue products, whereas other players 
were underpaid. 
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created for the period 1950-2003. This contains a wide range of output characteristics 
for each player, along with salary information for 1985 onwards. It can be considered 
equivalent to a linked employer-employee dataset, as the data follow players as they 
move from team to team over the course of their careers. The final dataset is at an 
annual frequency, with the statistics for players who appear for more than team in a 
season aggregated appropriately. A player is classified as a pitcher if he pitched in any 
game during a season, unless he pitched in fewer than 4 games and batted in at least 
15 games, in which he is considered a non-pitcher. Details of the 39 teams that are 
used in the analysis are given in Appendix 1.5 For the purposes of this analysis, a new 
team is assumed to be created whenever a team moves cities. 
Means for the samples used in the performance regressions in Section 4 are 
presented in Table 3.1. As will be discussed later, three years of data are lost due to 
the model specification and estimation technique, so the data here cover the period 
1953-2003. Non-pitchers are seen to have slightly longer careers than pitchers on 
average. They also have a significantly higher chance of being selected for the all-star 
team. 
Although the dataset includes annual salary from 1985, it does not include details 
about the start and finish dates of players’ contracts. In order to construct a contract-
level dataset, additional information were obtained for contracts signed since 1998 and 
these were merged with the primary data.6 Of the 7,286 player-year observations over 
the 1998-2003 period, contract details are known for 2,056, that is, in 28% of cases. 
Using this information, the average real salary over the duration of the contract was 
computed. The analysis in Section 4 also uses annual salary data for 1985-2003 for 
                                                 
5 The Boston Braves existed until 1952, however, as noted in the text, the earliest observations that are 
actually used in the analysis are from 1953. 
6 Data were also collected on a few contracts signed before 1998 but these are excluded from the 
analysis. 
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Table 3.1 
Means for the performance regression samples 
 
Variable Pitchers Non-pitchers 
Experience 7.061 7.390 
All star appearances 0.081 0.130 
Win percentage 0.457 – 
Earned run average 4.428 – 
Start percentage 0.459 – 
Save percentage 0.059 – 
Batting average – 0.252 
Extra bases/at bats – 0.202 
Walks/at bats – 0.103 
Stolen bases/game – 0.049 
Gold Glove – 0.049 
Catcher – 0.152 
Infield – 0.311 
Team earned run average 3.961 3.926 
Team save percentage 0.204 0.219 
Team batting average 0.260 0.258 
Team extra bases/at-bats 0.213 0.210 
Team walks/at-bats 0.098 0.097 
Team stolen bases/game 0.622 0.583 
Number of observations 9,246 13,876 
Notes: Data are at an annual frequency for 1953-2003. 
those players who are in their first six years in the major leagues and have therefore 
not attained free agency status. In both cases, average salary is expressed in constant 
(2000) dollar values, using the price deflator from the Consumer Price Index. 
Means for the contract-level and annual datasets are presented in Table 3.2. 
Roughly two-thirds of the contracts are for one year and most commence in the last 
three years of the sample period. In comparison, the annual sample has a much lower 
average salary, due to the fact that this sample contains observations for earlier years 
and only includes players with relatively little experience and little bargaining power. 
 
3. Approach 
 The first stage of the analysis involves analyzing the determinants of various 
individual productivity measures. The same set of statistics was selected as in Kahn 
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Table 3.2 
Means for the salary regression samples 
 
Variable Pitchers Non-pitchers 
Contract-level sample:   
Commenced in 1998-2000 0.134 0.157 
Commenced in 2001 0.230 0.217 
Commenced in 2002 0.240 0.240 
Commenced in 2003 0.397 0.386 
One year duration 0.661 0.652 
Two year duration 0.152 0.109 
Three year duration 0.114 0.090 
Four year duration 0.052 0.088 
Five years or more duration 0.022 0.061 
Average contract salary 3,129,500 3,379,948 
Number of observations 501 658 
Annual sample:   
Average salary 976,610 1,083,565 
Number of observations 2178 2699 
Notes: Salary is expressed in constant (2000) dollar values. 
(1993). For pitchers, these are ERA, winning percentage, the percentage of games in 
which he started, the percentage of appearances that resulted in a save and a dummy 
variable for whether he was named on the all-star team that season. For non-pitchers, 
they are batting average, extra bases obtained through extra base hits per at bat, walks 
per at bat, stolen bases per game, dummy variables for catchers and non-first base 
infielders, a dummy variable for whether the player was named on the all-star team 
and a dummy variable for whether he won a Gold Glove award. Each of these 
variables is regressed in turn on two lags of the full set of individual performance 
measures and the contemporaneous value and first lag of a set of team-mate 
performance measures, along with a quadratic in major league experience: 
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effect; and  is a year fixed effect.jtλ 7 The team performance measures that are 
included in Y are ERA, batting average, extra bases per at bat and walks per at bat.8 
 The  coefficients are assumed to capture the effect of contemporaneous team-
mate spillovers while the  coefficients will be interpreted as reflecting learning 
effects that persist from year to year. 
0β
1β
 Since Equation 3.4 includes two lags of the dependent variable on the right hand 
side, it cannot be estimated using traditional panel data techniques. Instead, the 
method of Arellano and Bond (1991) may be employed. In the present context, this 
involves first-differencing the equation to remove θ and then estimating the 
differenced equation with instrumental variables, where the lagged dependent 
variables are instrumented by earlier lags of y. 
 Salary regressions will also be estimated to assess how closely pay is tied to 
individual performance. The following specification will be used: 
 ittistiittititicw ςψπη ++++++− ),(2(1)1ln δZyγ= (y − )2 γ)(
(ticw
, (3.5) 
where )  is the average real (in 2000 dollars) annual salary received by player i 
under contract c, which begins in year t, y  is a person’s average performance over his 
entire career and  includes experience, experience squared and three dummies for 
free agency eligibility status. A player is eligible for free agency after six years of 
major league experience and is generally eligible for salary arbitration after three years 
of experience.
itZ
9 Hence, following Kahn (1993), the free agency dummies identify 
                                                 
7 Including two lags of the individual performance measures allows current performance to be a 
function of recent performance. If they are excluded, standard fixed effects estimation can be used, 
although the results are very similar to those presented in the next section. 
8 Y has an i subscript in Equation 3.4 to indicate that it is calculated exclusive of player i. Team winning 
percentage, team save percentage and team stolen bases/game are not included as they are arguably 
endogenous to individual performance. 
9 A player is also eligible for salary arbitration if he meets the so-called “super two” exception, namely 
that he has two years of experience, played in the major leagues for at least 86 days in the previous 
season and is among the top 17% of players for cumulative playing time in the major leagues amongst 
those with exactly two years of experience. This exception is ignored here. 
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those players who have three or four years of experience and are thus eligible for 
salary arbitration but not in their last year of eligibility; those who have exactly five 
years of experience and, as such, are in their last year of eligibility for salary 
arbitration; and those who have at least six years of experience and are therefore free 
agents. The contract length dummies identify those contracts that are for two years, 
three years, four years and five years or more. For pitchers, y also includes, in addition 
to the variables described earlier, the interaction of start percentage with winning 
percentage, ERA and save percentage. 
                                                
 
4. Results 
a. Performance equations 
The results of estimation of Equation 3.4 for pitchers are presented in Table 3.3. 
Although not reported, the coefficients on the lags of the individual performance 
measures indicate that performance exhibits hysteresis. The year effects are jointly 
significant for ERA, winning percentage and start percentage, indicating that there 
have been no major trends in the other pitching statistics used.10 
The results in Table 3.3 suggest that both productivity spillovers and learning 
occur among pitchers. Players benefit if their pitching colleagues play well during a 
season. A 1 run decrease in a team-mate ERA results in a 0.324 run reduction in a 
pitcher’s ERA during the same season. Not surprisingly, a player’s winning 
percentage is positively related to the team’s offensive ability, including batting 
average and extra bases and walks per at bat, and other pitchers’ ERAs. In addition, a 
 
10 A requirement of Arellano-Bond estimation is that the differenced error terms not exhibit second 
order autocorrelation. All the models in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 satisfy this requirement except the start 
percentage regression for pitchers and batting average regression for non-pitchers. 
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Table 3.3 
Performance regressions for pitchers 
 
Variable Earned run 
average 
Winning 
percentage 
Start 
percentage 
Save 
percentage All-star 
Current value:      
Team earned run 
average 
0.324*** 
(0.081) 
-0.029*** 
(0.008) 
0.042*** 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.012 
(0.009) 
Team batting 
average 
-2.484 
(4.881) 
1.895*** 
(0.352) 
0.191 
(0.343) 
0.037 
(0.114) 
-0.057 
(0.430) 
Team extra 
bases/at-bats 
0.402 
(2.731) 
0.647*** 
(0.156) 
-0.446*** 
(0.168) 
0.009 
(0.057) 
-0.105 
(0.184) 
Team walks/at-
bats 
-1.424 
(3.545) 
1.280*** 
(0.285) 
-0.314 
(0.270) 
-0.074 
(0.109) 
0.417 
(0.322) 
Lagged value:      
Team earned run 
average 
0.312*** 
(0.119) 
-0.021*** 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.008) 
Team batting 
average 
-9.220 
(6.718) 
0.503 
(0.346) 
1.151*** 
(0.335) 
-0.016 
(0.119) 
0.528 
(0.400) 
Team extra 
bases/at-bats 
1.168 
(2.029) 
0.308* 
(0.163) 
0.172 
(0.154) 
-0.005 
(0.052) 
-0.029 
(0.167) 
Team walks/at-
bats 
-10.195** 
(4.627) 
0.507* 
(0.284) 
0.590** 
(0.281) 
-0.219** 
(0.106) 
-0.071 
(0.307) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.024 0.040 0.009 0.041 0.056 
Number of 
observations 9,246 9,246 9,246 9,246 9,246 
Notes: All models also include two lags of the pitcher performance measures, experience, experience 
squared and a full set of player, team and year dummies. 
 Arellano-Bond estimation is used, with the third and fourth lags of the dependent variable used 
to instrument the lags of the dependent variable. 
Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
player is likely to start more games if his fellow pitchers record high ERAs and he 
plays for a weak-hitting team. 
In addition, the lagged values of some team performance measures have 
significant coefficients, suggesting that pitchers learn from their team-mates. A 1 run 
reduction in a player’s team-mates’ collective ERA will reduce his ERA in the 
following season by 0.312. A pitcher is also likely to win more games if his colleagues 
had low ERAs and will start more games if his team’s batting average was high. 
Table 3.4 presents the results of the performance regressions for non-pitchers. The 
year effects are jointly significant in all cases except the all-star and Gold Glove 
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Table 3.4 
Performance regressions for non-pitchers 
 
Variable Batting 
average 
Extra bases/ 
at-bats 
Walks/ 
at-bats 
Stolen 
bases/game All-star 
Gold 
Glove 
Current value:       
Team earned run 
average 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.008) 
-0.009* 
(0.005) 
Team batting 
average 
0.050 
(0.061) 
0.005 
(0.090) 
-0.056 
(0.054) 
-0.105** 
(0.053) 
0.358 
(0.365) 
0.597*** 
(0.224) 
Team extra 
bases/at-bats 
-0.018 
(0.031) 
0.074 
(0.046) 
0.022 
(0.034) 
-0.071*** 
(0.027) 
-0.050 
(0.171) 
-0.063 
(0.094) 
Team walks/at-
bats 
0.085* 
(0.051) 
0.120 
(0.080) 
0.090* 
(0.051) 
0.104** 
(0.046) 
0.085 
(0.284) 
0.326* 
(0.183) 
Lagged value:       
Team earned run 
average 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
Team batting 
average 
0.137** 
(0.058) 
0.161* 
(0.096) 
-0.003 
(0.055) 
0.010 
(0.053) 
0.126 
(0.356) 
0.308 
(0.216) 
Team extra 
bases/at-bats 
-0.021 
(0.030) 
-0.017 
(0.047) 
-0.026 
(0.028) 
0.009 
(0.023) 
-0.114 
(0.165) 
-0.001 
(0.100) 
Team walks/at-
bats 
0.046 
(0.047) 
-0.015 
(0.080) 
0.018 
(0.060) 
-0.031 
(0.043) 
0.740*** 
(0.277) 
0.026 
(0.159) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.045 0.015 0.010 0.088 0.141 0.122 
Number of 
observations 13,876 13,876 13,876 13,876 13,876 13,876 
Notes: All models also include two lags of the non-pitcher performance measures, experience, 
experience squared and a full set of player, team and year dummies. 
 Arellano-Bond estimation is used, with the third and fourth lags of the dependent variable used 
to instrument the lags of the dependent variable. 
Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
awards. Once again, there appears to be evidence of both productivity spillovers and 
learning. A player’s batting average is positively related to how often his team-mates 
walk, suggesting that players benefit from having patient players alongside them in the 
line-up. An individual’s stolen bases per game are negatively related to the team’s 
batting average and frequency of extra base hits, consistent with the notion that 
players steal more bases to compensate for a lack of power hitting in the line-up. 
Finally, a player’s chances of winning a Gold Glove are enhanced if his team’s 
collective ERA is low and their team-mates score a lot of hits and walks. 
Learning appears to take place among batters with batting average and extra bases 
 70
per at-bat being positively related to team-mates’ batting average in the previous year. 
A 0.1 increase in team batting average will increase a player’s average by 0.014 in the 
next season. 
 
b. Salary equations 
The results of estimating Equation 3.5 for pitchers using the contract-level dataset 
are reported in Table 3.5. The first column includes only individual performance 
measures, while the second column adds team measures. In all cases, free agents and 
those eligible for arbitration only are found to earn more than those eligible for neither 
arbitration nor free agency. Salary is negatively related to a player’s ERA two seasons 
before the contract begins. The corresponding results for non-pitchers are presented in 
Table 3.6. Batting average and the number of extra bases per at bat are found to be 
strongly positively related to average salary. Although not reported in Tables 3.5 and 
3.6, average contract salary is found to be concave in major league experience for both 
pitchers and batters and longer contracts are associated with higher salaries. The team 
effects are not jointly significant in any case, while the player effects are jointly 
significant for the non-pitcher regressions only. 
When team performance characteristics are added to the estimation equation in the 
second columns of Tables 3.5 and 3.6, a number of the coefficients are significant. 
Team-mate performance in the previous period influences the pay of pitchers, while 
non-pitchers are affected most by team-mate performance over their entire careers. 
While these results imply that team-mate ability has a direct effect on salary, Tables 
3.3 and 3.4 have established that it also operates indirectly through its influence on 
individual performance. The overall impact of the team performance measures may 
therefore be larger than the estimates in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. 
The results in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 are largely consistent with the findings of Kahn 
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Table 3.5 
Salary regressions for pitchers using contract-level sample 
 
Variable (i) (ii) 
 Lag Career Lag Career 
Arbitration eligible (but not in 
last year) 
0.558 
(0.365) 
0.545 
(0.363) 
Last year before free agency 1.127** 
(0.462) 
1.069** 
(0.458) 
Free agent 1.157* 
(0.590) 
0.999* 
(0.588) 
Win percentage 0.196 
(2.446) 
-8.080 
(5.274) 
-1.345 
(2.440) 
-10.580* 
(5.341) 
Earned run average -0.069 -0.242 -0.097 -0.094 
(0.097) (0.228) (0.100) (0.240) 
Start percentage 0.303 -2.577 -0.115 -2.326 
(1.045) (1.974) (1.067) (1.943) 
Save percentage 0.821 1.528 1.008 1.559 
(0.826) (4.111) (0.798) (4.009) 
Start percentage × win 
percentage 
1.460 9.728* 3.347 12.291** 
(2.760) (5.256) (2.782) (5.350) 
Start percentage × earned run 
average 
-0.037 0.199 -0.026 -0.061 
(0.159) (0.289) (0.161) (0.290) 
Start percentage × save 
percentage 
4.272 3.307 10.927 9.209 
(13.552) (13.685) (13.252) (13.880) 
All-star appearances 0.206 -0.392 0.210 -1.957 
(0.311) (1.733) (0.312) (1.843) 
Team earned run average  0.379* -1.244 
 (0.216) (0.832) 
Team batting average  3.799 -4.208 
 (9.032) (34.280) 
Team extra bases/at-bats  -34.091** 1.942 
 (13.023) (53.261) 
Team walks/at-bats  14.379* -3.985 
 (7.373) (34.723) 
corr(η,ψ) -0.533*** -0.457*** 
R-squared 0.948 0.957 
Number of observations 501 501 
Notes: All models also include a full set of player, team and year dummies. 
Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
(1993), although they are generally weaker, which is likely a result of the smaller 
sample size here. This is due to the limited amount of contract information that could 
be collected. An alternative approach is to use annual salary data for the entire period 
they are available, 1985-2003, but to restrict the sample to those people who have not 
attained free agency, i.e. those with less than six years of major league experience. 
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Table 3.6 
Salary regressions for non-pitchers using contract-level sample 
 
Variable (i) (ii) 
 Lag Career Lag Career 
Arbitration eligible (but not 
in last year) 
-0.062 0.053 
(0.255) (0.257) 
Last year before free agency 0.096 0.191 
(0.321) (0.323) 
Free agent 0.097 0.205 
(0.394) (0.398) 
Batting average 3.471* 2.526 3.649** 1.613 
(1.793) (2.174) (1.817) (2.213) 
Extra bases/at-bats 3.812*** -1.654 3.508*** -1.149 
(0.983) (1.937) (1.013) (1.964) 
Walks/at-bats -0.551 6.288* -0.964 5.982 
(1.606) (3.564) (1.670) (3.660) 
Stolen bases/game 2.347** 2.428 2.460** 1.873 
(1.154) (2.640) (1.153) (2.749) 
All-star appearances 0.257** 1.740*** 0.257* 1.807*** 
(0.138) (0.654) (0.137) (0.672) 
Gold Glove -0.260 -0.508 0.257* -0.697 
(0.194) (1.120) (0.136) (1.117) 
Catcher -0.410 -0.445* 
(0.267) (0.265) 
Infield 0.265 0.194 
(0.177) (0.176) 
Team earned run average 0.031 0.723* 
(0.102) (0.371)   
Team batting average 3.077 43.191** 
(4.823) (20.397)   
Team extra bases/at-bats 
Figure 3.1 shows that the contract length-experience profile has a U shape. Although a 
sizeable fraction of non-free agents are on multiple-year contracts, the vast majority 
are in the first year of a contract. To this extent, it seems reasonable to think that these 
players’ annual salaries will be influenced by their performances in the previous two 
years. 
  
7.667 -49.003 
(8.317) (31.276) 
Team walks/at-bats 
  
-3.825 -30.098* 
(4.352) (16.478) 
corr(η,ψ) -0.299*** -0.246*** 
R-squared 0.948 0.952 
Number of observations 659 659 
Notes: All models also include a full set of player, team and year dummies. 
Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
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Figure 3.1 
Experience and contract length 
 
The first column of Table 3.7 presents the results of salary regressions for pitchers 
using this sample and excluding team variables. As noted in Table 3.5, salary is 
negative related to a player’s ERA, however save percentage and all-star appearances 
in the previous two years are also found to have significant effects on salary in any 
given season. Similarly, the first column of Table 3.8 supports the findings of Table 
3.6 and finds a strong positive relationship between salary and both batting average 
and extra base average. In addition, a player’s salary will be higher if in the previous 
two seasons he stole a lot of bases, was an all-star or won a Gold Glove. 
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 also report the results of salary regressions for those players 
who have attained free agency, i.e. those players with at least seven years of 
experience. Since many of these players may be on multiple-year contracts, annual 
salary may be determined years in advance and may not reflect a player’s recent 
performance level. On the other hand, free agents are more likely to be paid according 
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Table 3.7 
Salary regressions for pitchers using annual data 
to their market value.  Free agent pitchers, in particular, are found to have salaries that 
are closely related to their recent performance. Over the course of a pitcher’s career, 
however, the most important salary determinant is ERA. Non-pitchers, in contrast, 
appear to be remunerated largely according to their career output, although previous 
season batting average and stolen bases are also positively related to salary, as is being 
named on the all-star team. 
Tables 3.5-3.8 also report the correlations between the estimated player and team 
effects. In all specifications except the second column of Table 3.8, this is found to be 
negative and significant, suggesting that there is negative assortative matching in the 
baseball labor market. This is a surprising finding, albeit one that is consistent with 
many of the papers estimating wage equations using linked employer-employee 
 
Variable Non-free agents Free agents 
Lag Career Lag Career 
Win percentage 0.426 
(0.311) 
0.311 
(0.378) 
1.142*** 
(0.416) 
1.647 
(1.534) 
Earned run average -0.011* 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.011) 
-0.095*** 
(0.014) 
-0.821*** 
(0.103) 
Start percentage 0.307** 
(0.135) 
0.103 
(0.168) 
0.693*** 
(0.179) 
-1.407 
(0.960) 
Save percentage 0.976*** 
(0.164) 
1.009*** 
(0.275) 
1.064*** 
(0.151) 
0.567 
(0.617) 
Start percentage × win 
percentage 
0.405 
(0.352) 
0.426 
(0.433) 
-0.533 
(0.444) 
2.217 
(1.512) 
Start percentage × earned run 
average 
-0.035** 
(0.018) 
-0.001 
(0.020) 
-0.044 
(0.027) 
0.118 
(0.169) 
Start percentage × save 
percentage 
0.279 
(1.617) 
3.109* 
(1.701) 
2.471 
(1.691) 
4.815** 
(2.433) 
All-star appearances 0.225*** 
(0.062) 
1.163*** 
(0.186) 
-0.015 
(0.049) 
0.251 
(0.316) 
corr(η,ψ) -0.149*** -0.111*** 
R-squared 0.897 0.815 
Number of observations 2,178 2,188 
Notes: All models also include a quadratic in experience and a full set of year dummies, player 
dummies and team dummies. 
8
Sa a lary regressions for non-pitchers using annual dat
Batting aver 0.  22 * 970*** 023 3 963 .136**
263 21 357 998
xtra bases/at-b ts 0.553* * 0  .659*** .288 3.598  
157 159 187 925
W lks/at-ba s 0.414 066 0.166 3.834** 
286 250 310 1 5 6
tol n bases/game 89 .050 0 883 1 0 5
240 320 228 820
All-star appe rances 0  0  0  .352*** .893*** 0. 70** .954***
0 3 164 03 0 207
Gold Glove 0.316*  0.566** 59 74
80 251 53 2 6
cor (η,ψ) -0.170*** 0.009 
R-squared 0.888 0.862 
Number of observations 2,700 3,259 
Notes: All models also include a c in expe nd a full  
ummies and team dummies. 
ndard errors are presented in paren  *, ** and *** denote signific  the 10%, 5% 
spectively. 
 quadrati rience a  set of year dummies, player
d
Sta theses. ance at
and 1% level, re
Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 3.9 
Effect of team performance on log salary 
 
Variable Pitchers Non-pitchers 
Lag Career Lag Career 
Team earned run average 8  0.030*** .587*** 0.003 -0.003 
(0.008) (0.099) (0.005)  (0.005) 
Team batting average -  0.719 808.941*** 0.028 0.810* 
(0.520) (11.815)  (0.213)  (0.430) 
Team extra bases/at-bats -0.366** -63 * .681** -0.100 -0.370 
(0.146)  (3.760)  (0.122)  (0.261) 
Team walks/at-bats -15 1  -0.258 5.451***  0.451*** .138***
(0.337)  (9.039)  (0.127)  (0.383) 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard erro ed in s, where ions a * 
and *** denote significance %, 5% an el, respec
rs are present  parenthese  30 replicat re used. *, *
tively.  at the 10 d 1% lev
data.  Fi11 gures 3.A1 and 3.A2 plot ated team effects aga e average 
s, have very high player effects, while also having relatively small team effects. 
 is not noticeable among non-pitchers, although there is still a high degree 
of heterogeneity between teams. 
sesses the overall impact that team performance has on salary, using 
the annual salary data but including both free agents and non-free agents in the 
regressions. Bootstrapped standard errors are presented for each coefficient. The first 
lumns report the effect that team variables have on an individual’s salary 
wing year. These values are the elements of the vector , where 
][0 ββ = . The second and fourth columns of the table indicate what effect a given 
increase in team-mate performance has over a player’s entire career. These are 
calculated by first simulating the effect of a one unit increase in each team 
                                                
t imhe est inst th
player effect for each team, using the results from Tables 3.7 and 3.8, respectively. For 
pitchers
team
This pattern
 Table 3.9 as
and third co
in the follo
, the Arizona Diamondbacks and Tampa Bay Devil Rays, two recently-formed 
10γβ
0
j
 
11 Barth and Dale-Olsen (2003) noted that if it is impossible for anyone to distinguish between the 
component of productivity that is due to the firm (or team) and the component that is due to the worker 
(or player), then it is only the sum of these terms that matters to all agents. In this case, the estimation 
method could lead to a negative observed correlation between firm and worker effects, even if the two 
factors are complements in production. 
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productivity measure in every 
debut season, taking into account the ind rect effects team performance has on 
individual performance from one year to th  The rep  coeffici the 
average value of this variable ll playe years. I n that 
performance has some signific cts on s the foll ason. The results 
id be y play s 
alongsi
 
 influences a 
player’s perfor
alyze the effect of contemporaneous co-worker output on earnings. 
year a player appears in the dataset, starting with his 
i
e next. orted ent is 
 over a rs and t is see team-mate 
ant effe alary in owing se
for pitchers are strongest and suggest that they are pa tter if the  for team
with weak pitching and hitting. In contrast, hers ar etter if ay 
de hitters with high averages and who walk often. 
non-pitc e paid b  they pl
5. Conclusion 
 This paper has exploited a rich source of performance and salary data for major 
league baseball players to examine the ways in which team-mate ability
mance each year. Any impacts contemporaneous team performance 
may have on individual performance are termed spillovers, while the effect of team 
performance in previous seasons is considered indicative of learning amongst players. 
Evidence of both effects is found in the data. Pitchers play better if the pitchers on the 
same team played well in the same season or the previous season; batters achieve 
more and heavier hits if their batting colleagues performed well in the previous 
season. Evidence from salary regressions suggests that there are some direct links 
between pay and team performance, however team-mates also have an indirect effect 
on salary via individual performance. The latter effect is particularly noticeable for 
pitchers. These results suggest that workers may have impacts on the pay of their co-
workers that only appear after time has passed and, as such, are overlooked by studies 
that an
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Table 3.A1 
Teams used in the analysis 
 
Team name Abbreviation Years in dataset 
Anaheim Angels ANA 1965-2003 
Arizona Diamondbacks ARI 1998-2003 
Atlanta Braves ATL 1966-2003 
Baltimore Orioles BAL 1954-2003 
Boston Red Sox BOS 1953-2003 
Brooklyn Dodgers BRO 1953-1957 
Chicago Cubs CHN 1953-2003 
Chicago White Sox CHA 1953-2003 
Cincinnati Reds CIN 1953-2003 
Cleveland Indians CLE 1953-2003 
Colorado Rockies COL 1993-2003 
Detroit Tigers DET 1953-2003 
Florida Marlins FLO 1993-2003 
Houston Astros HOU 1962-2003 
Kansas City Athletics KC1 1955-1967 
Kansas City Royals KCA 1969-2003 
Los Angeles Dodgers LAN 1958-2003 
Milwaukee Braves ML1 1953-1965 
Milwaukee Brewers MIL 1970-2003 
Minnesota Twins MIN 1961-2003 
Montreal Expos MON 1969-2003 
New York Giants NY1 1953-1957 
New York Mets NYN 1962-2003 
New York Yankees NYA 1953-2003 
Oakland Athletics OAK 1968-2003 
Philadelphia Athletics PHA 1953-1954 
Philadelphia Phillies PHI 1953-2003 
Pittsburgh Pirates PIT 1953-2003 
San Diego Padres SDN 1969-2003 
San Francisco Giants SFN 1958-2003 
Seattle Mariners SE1 1977-2003 
Seattle Pilots SEA 1969-1969 
St Louis Browns SLA 1953-1953 
St Louis Cardinals SLN 1953-2003 
Tampa Bay Devil Rays TBA 1998-2003 
Texas Rangers TEX 1972-2003 
Toronto Blue Jays TOR 1977-2003 
Washington Nationals WS1 1953-1960 
Washington Senators WS2 1961-1971 
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4. Job tenure and wage determination within firms 
 
“Example is the school of mankind, and they will learn at no other.” 
EDMUND BURKE 
 
 Traditional theories of labor demand imply that workers’ pay is determined solely 
by their marginal products of labor. However, there are many alternative theories that 
predict that one worker may influence the productivity and, hence, the wage rate of 
others. These effects have been termed human capital spillovers. In one well-known 
paper, Kremer (1993) considered a production function in which the abilities of 
workers enter in a multiplicative fashion. A consequence of this is that profit-
maximizing firms will choose workers of identical abilities. In more sophisticated 
models, firms hire differently-skilled workers but pay them according to the skill mix 
of the other workers in the firm. 
 The various predictions of these theories have been largely untested before now, 
primarily due to the lack of datasets providing information on all workers at a set of 
firms. Matched employer-employee data, based on administrative records, allow the 
analyst to observe wage and employment records on the vast majority of workers in 
the economy and, hence, identify the employees at each firm. However, these data 
typically contain little additional demographic information on individuals, hindering 
their usefulness for studies of human capital spillovers. 
 This paper aims to determine whether a person’s ability affects the wages of his 
co-workers and, if so, which co-workers. Linked employer-employee data from the 
United States Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) 
program are used. This includes information on what quarters a person was employed 
in a particular job, meaning that job tenure can be calculated for all jobs that begin 
after the first quarter in the dataset. However, since the dataset does not include 
 84
retrospective information on when each worker began his/her job, tenure is left-
censored at the point where each state enters the program. In this paper, the missing 
values on job tenure are imputed by drawing on data from the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP). 
 Using the completed tenure variable, along with a previously-imputed education 
variable, a set of wage regressions is then estimated. The average education level and 
tenure within each firm are both found to have a positive effect on workers’ earnings, 
ceteris paribus, indicating the existence of intra-firm human capital spillovers. These 
effects are stronger among women than among men. Furthermore, the interaction of 
own tenure and firm tenure is found have a negative effect on wages, suggesting that 
new entrants are most influenced by the average experience of their colleagues. In 
contrast, the interaction of own and firm education is found to have a positive impact 
on wages, implying that highly-educated workers benefit most from an increase in the 
education level within a firm. 
 The next section reviews the literature on intra-firm human capital spillovers, 
followed by a discussion of the data sources used in this project and how they are 
combined with one another. Section 3 explains the method that is used to impute 
values for each person’s initial tenure where it is missing. Using the completed tenure 
variable, Section 4 presents some basic wage regressions for men and women using a 
5% random sample of workers from the 25 states in the LEHD data. 
 
1. Literature review 
 A seminal paper on intra-firm productivity spillovers was by Rosen (1982). This 
formalized an earlier model of Mayer (1960), while adopting a production function 
that is similar to that of Lucas (1978). His model relies on a hierarchical description of 
firms, whereby workers at each “level” of the operation are responsible for monitoring 
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the efforts of workers at the level immediately below them.1 By doing so, they 
increase the output of their subordinates by an amount that is dependent on the 
individual’s skill, thereby creating human capital externalities. A worker i in the 
bottom-level production activity is assumed to have productivity . A manager j in 
the next tier up is assumed to have skill  and to devote time  to monitoring 
production worker i. This individual’s total output is then assumed to be given by: 
iq
tjr i
 . (4.1) ∑=
i
iijj qrtfrgX ),()(
 Management skill r can be viewed as an intra-firm public good, insofar as it 
increases the productivity of all subordinates, irrespective of their numbers. A 
manager with skill s at the third level oversees multiple second-level workers and, 
hence, has output: 
 . (4.2) ∑=
j
ji XsvFsGY ),()(
 All higher management levels are analogous. Each person is assumed to have a 
profile of “latent” skills: . Rosen assumes that the various skill components 
are positively correlated for each individual and are determined by a single random 
variable, ξ. 
,...),,( srq
 A two-level firm has a production function defined by the following maximization 
problem: 
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 In general, the solution to this will comprise a production function that features 
each  as a factor of production. Hence, the size and skill composition is important. 
However, if f exhibits constant returns to scale, so that 
iq
)/(),( qrtqqrtf θ= , 
                                                 
1 Although Rosen considered monitoring of subordinate workers to be the mechanism via which human 
capital spillovers are propagated, he conceded that it admits other interpretations. Kremer and Maskin’s 
(1996) work suggests that this may simply be viewed as different tasks within firms being 
complementary in production. 
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equilibrium production is found to depend only on the total amount of production 
labor controlled, Q, not on the number or skill distribution of production workers: 
 ∑ ==
i
i Q
rTQrg
Q
tTrgqX )()()()( θθ . (4.4) 
 In this case, production workers are perfect substitutes. Given a competitive labor 
market, Q should be chosen to satisfy: 
 
p
w
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Q
rrg =′− ))()()(( θθ . (4.5) 
 Comparative statics reveal that both production labor hired and output produced 
rise more than proportionately with managerial talent, r. Constant returns to scale 
implies that the case of multi-level firms is a simple extension of the above analysis. 
Firms can be disassembled to any number of ranks, implying that in equilibrium every 
manager would receive the same income regardless of how many ranks were “above” 
him. 
 Kremer (1993) developed a theory in which production is subject to “mistakes” in 
any of several tasks. Expected production can be written as follows: 
 , (4.6) ∏
=
=
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where k is capital, n is the number of tasks,  is the expected percentage of maximum 
value the product retains if a worker performs task i and B is output per worker with a 
single unit of capital if all tasks are performed perfectly. The firm’s objective function 
is: 
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 Kremer notes that a necessary condition for any solution is that q be the same for 
all workers within a firm. He concludes that the set of wage schedules consistent with 
the first order conditions from Equation 4.7 are given by: 
 , (4.8) cBkqqw n +−= αα )1()(
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where c represents the wage of a worker who never performs a task successfully. The 
zero profit condition implies that c = 0. Kremer notes that the equilibrium level of n 
(which is presumably related to firm size) must satisfy the following condition: 
 
)(
)(ln
nB
nBq
′=− . (4.9) 
 He also examines the effect of endogenizing skill, by treating it as the product of 
investment in education, and of allowing for imperfect matching between workers and 
firms. 
 Kremer and Maskin (1996) extend the so-called O-ring theory and develop a 
model in which workers are imperfect substitutes. They use a simple production 
function, which is based on the following: 
 , (4.10) αqqqqf ′=′),(
where q and q' are the skills of two workers hired for two separate tasks (e.g. 
management and production) and α > 1. The authors note that, under the constant 
returns to scale assumption, Lucas’s and Rosen’s production functions allow no 
substitution of skill at the management level but perfect substitution at the production 
level. On the other hand, their production function imposes imperfect substitutability 
on subordinates as well as managers. 
 A similar model to Kremer (1993) is presented by Saint-Paul (2001). This allows 
for a more general pattern of human capital spillovers than the O-ring theory, although 
it does not take into account the hierarchical nature of workplaces. In Saint-Paul’s 
model, firm k’s output is equal to )( kya , where y  is the average skill level of its 
workers. There is a mass 1 of workers and each firm consists of a mass s of workers. 
The equilibrium wage schedule is shown to be: 
 
s
yyya
s
yayw kkk ))(()()( −′+= , (4.11) 
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if firm k employs some workers of type y. This equation clearly demonstrates how a 
worker’s wage is directly affected by co-workers’ levels of human capital. Saint-Paul 
demonstrates that each firm’s equilibrium wage schedule is linear and the overall 
wage schedule is convex.2 There may or may or not be segregation of differently-
skilled workers. Since all spillovers are internalized by firms and reflected in the wage 
structure, the equilibrium is efficient. 
 Very few empirical studies have examined the existence of intra-firm productivity 
spillovers, primarily due to the paucity of datasets that allow the researcher to assess 
the quality of an individual’s co-workers.3 Battu et al. (2003) and Metcalfe and Sloane 
(2007) both used data from the British Workplace Employee Relations Survey to 
estimate the effect co-workers’ education has on earnings. This dataset has 
establishment-level information for over 2,000 British workplaces with at least five 
workers, along with individual-level information for 25 randomly-selected workers at 
each establishment. Battu et al. regressed log earnings on own education and average 
co-worker education, as well as the interaction of these terms or a measure of 
workplace educational dispersion. Spillover effects were found to have a positive 
effect on earnings and this was independent of a worker’s own education. However, 
they found no support for Kremer’s (1993) hypothesis that co-worker education has 
the largest impact on wages when workers have a uniform level of education. 
Furthermore, there was no evidence that co-worker effects are strongest in high-skilled 
workplaces, thus rejecting the notion of increasing returns to human capital. Metcalfe 
                                                 
2 Specifically, two firms either offer the same wage schedule or they obey a sorting property, whereby 
the most skilled worker at one firm is less skilled than the least skilled worker at the other firm. 
3 There have, however, been many studies of human capital spillovers at the regional level. For 
example, Rauch (1993) used 1980 United States Census data and concluded that the average level of 
human capital is a local public good. Moretti (2002) also found evidence of productivity spillovers 
within detailed city/industry cells, combining data from the Censuses of Manufacturers and Population. 
On the other hand, Rudd (2000) used Current Population Survey data and found little evidence that the 
average level of human capital in a region affects the earnings of individuals in that region, independent 
of their own characteristics. 
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and Sloane also concluded that workplace education and training have positive effects 
on hourly pay. In addition, they found that the interaction of own and co-worker 
education had a negative impact on wages, while the interaction of own and co-worker 
training had a positive impact. 
 Using linked employer-employee data from the LEHD program, Abowd et al. 
(2002) examined the relationship between firm-level measures of workforce human 
capital and productivity and the market value of the firm. They note that production 
functions may give rise to interaction effects across the skills of co-workers and 
discuss Kremer and Maskin’s (1996) conclusion that if this interaction effect reflects 
complementarities across skill groups at the firm, then businesses with lower skill 
dispersion will be more productive. Their empirical results are consistent with the 
existence of complementarities across co-workers that differ on different dimensions 
of skill, although they are unable to test between competing explanations. 
 Only one previous empirical study has explicitly examined the effect of human 
capital externalities at the intra-firm level in the United States. Lengermann (2002) 
analyzed linked employer-employee data from the LEHD program for Illinois over the 
period 1990 to 1998. Although these data crucially allow the researcher to observe the 
wages of one’s co-workers, they suffer from a dearth of demographic variables. As a 
consequence, Lengermann relied on the measured person effects as a proxy for co-
worker skills. He modified the basic Abowd et al. (1999) specification to include co-
worker attributes as follows: 
 itjjtijtijtijtitit uy +++++= ψλθ 21 θWλXWβX ; (4.12) 
 ijtjtijtit uu ελ += 3W , (4.13) 
where  is a row vector of co-worker weights,  is a matrix of worker 
characteristics in firm j at time t and  is a vector of person effects for workers in 
firm j at time t. The co-worker effects are assumed to be captured by , 
ijtW jtX
jtθ
1λ 2λ  and 3λ . 
 90
Since the θ terms are not known ex ante, Equation 4.12 must be estimated by an 
iterative process. 
 Although co-worker effects were found to be quantitatively less important than 
individual and firm effects, there was considerable variation across industries. 
Lengermann found that a one standard deviation increase in both a firm’s average 
person effect and experience level yields wage increases of 3-5% on average. Industry 
average co-worker effects were found to explain 26% of observed inter-industry wage 
differentials. 
 
2. Data 
 The primary data used in this project are taken from the so-called Snapshot files, 
which are an edited version of the Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI) production 
and infrastructure files. These have been constructed by the LEHD program at the 
United States Census Bureau using administrative data provided by state agencies, 
enhanced with information from other administrative data sources, demographic and 
economic surveys and censuses. Complete Snapshot files are currently available for 25 
states. These contain data from the quarter the state entered the LEHD program to 
either the final quarter of 2003 or the first or second quarter of 2004. Full details are 
provided in the appendix. Three sets of files from the Snapshot are used in this 
analysis: the Employment History Files (EHFs), Individual Characteristics Files 
(ICFs) and Employer Characteristics Files (ECFs). Full details of these are given in 
Abowd et al. (forthcoming). 
 The EHFs contain the complete in-state work history for each individual that 
appears in the state unemployment insurance (UI) wage records. The EHF for each 
state contains one record for each employee-employer combination (a job) in that state 
in each year. An active job within a quarter is defined as having strictly positive 
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quarterly earnings for the individual-employer pair that define the job. Both annual 
and quarterly earnings variables are available in the EHF and each person is identified 
by a Protected Identification Key (PIK), while each firm is identified by a State 
Employer Identification Number (SEIN). 
 The ICF for each state contains one record for every person who is ever employed 
in that state over the time period spanned by the state’s UI records. Each person is 
identified by a PIK. Variables include a person’s date of birth, sex, place of residence, 
education level, race, place of birth and citizenship status. Sex and age information 
from the CPS is used to complement and verify the UI information. 
 The ECF consolidates most employer and establishment-level information into two 
files. This paper uses the employer-level file, which contains one record for every 
quarter in which an SEIN is present in the wage records. Variables include the 
employer’s size, payroll, location, industry and number of establishments. 
 Although the Snapshot files allow the researcher to identify whether a worker 
began or finished a job in a given quarter, they do not contain information on how 
long a person had held a job in the first period the data were reported.4 In contrast, the 
SIPP contains detailed information on each respondent’s entire job history. Hence, 
data from the SIPP can be used to impute a variable containing a person’s tenure in his 
current job. 
 The SIPP sample is a multistage stratified sample of the U.S. civilian non-
institutionalized population. It consists of a continuous series of national panels, with 
sample size ranging from approximately 14,000 to 36,700 interviewed households. For 
the 1990-1993 panels, a panel of households was introduced each year in February. A 
                                                 
4 As noted in the appendix, different states entered the LEHD program at different times, meaning that 
this initial period varies. 
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four-year panel was introduced in April 1996. The SIPP contains a detailed set of 
questions about labor force participation, program participation and income. 
 This project utilizes a cleaned-up set of confidential SIPP data files constructed 
from the 1990-1993 and 1996 panels by Martha Stinson at the Census Bureau. For 
each cohort of the SIPP, there are two files: a job-level file, which contains a set of 
variables containing information about every job held by SIPP respondents, including 
the SIPP ID for the person and the SEIN of the employer and a person-level file, 
containing detailed information about the person. There is also a “cross-walk” file, 
matching the SIPP person ID to a PIK, which is used in the Snapshot files. 
 By merging together the ECF, EHF and ICF files for each state, a set of job-
quarter-level files were created, containing each person’s sex, race, age, education 
level, earnings from wages and salary, foreign born status and the industry and payroll 
of his/her employer. Here, a “job” is taken to mean a unique combination of PIK and 
SEIN. A job start date variable is constructed, based on the first year that a job is 
observed. Where this is the period the state entered the LEHD program, the job start 
date is assumed to be missing. 
 The SIPP file is merged with the Snapshot dataset on a state-by-state basis, using 
the PIK to match individuals and the SEIN to distinguish between their job records.5 
Only records with missing job start dates (i.e. left censored observations) are kept and 
the job-quarter-level dataset is converted to a job-level dataset. 20.34% of the jobs had 
start dates in the SIPP that were later than the quarter a state entered the LEHD data. 
In these cases, the job was assumed to have begun in the first quarter in the dataset, i.e. 
the job tenure was zero. 
                                                 
5 This is achieved by first merging the PIK into the SIPP file from the SIPP crosswalk file. The SEIN is 
then merged in from the ECF using the PIK, EIN and year (since EIN can change over time in the 
Snapshot data) to match observations. 
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Table 4.1 
Characteristics of the matched SIPP/LEHD data 
 
Variable Number of observations in SIPP 
data 
Percentage with same value in 
LEHD data 
Sex 40,741 99.39 
Year of birth 40,745 90.32 
Industry (SIC division) 22,816 79.33 
Born outside US 27,172 92.74 
State of birth (US born only) 20,206 92.31 
Notes: The third column reports the percentage of the observations in the second column that match 
exactly on the variable in the first column.
 Table 4.1 provides some information about how well the SIPP records match the 
LEHD data. Among the SIPP observations that are matched to the LEHD data and 
have valid information on sex, almost all have the same value of sex in the LEHD 
data. Similarly, year of birth and birthplace match closely between the two data 
sources. Industry group matches somewhat less well, which is perhaps understandable, 
given that the SIPP data are based on self-reported information. This suggests that in 
the vast majority of cases the correct job has been linked between the SIPP and LEHD 
data.6 
 To ascertain whether the SIPP job start date matches well with the first date a job 
is observed in the LEHD data, a validation exercise was undertaken. Maryland is 
unique in that it has EHF information from 1985 onwards (see appendix), although 
ECF data are only available from 1990. This means that even though the data start 
period for the purposes of this study is 1990, information on job spells in the LEHD 
data that began up to five years earlier is available and can be compared with the 
corresponding SIPP information. Of the 424 job observations from the SIPP that were 
matched to the Maryland Snapshot data, 44% had exactly the same start quarter in 
both datasets, while 59% differed by no more than one quarter. 83% had a start quarter 
                                                 
6 Note that the sex, date of birth, industry and place of birth information from the SIPP will not be used 
elsewhere in this project – the corresponding variables from the LEHD data will be used instead. 
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that was no more than one calendar year apart in the SIPP and LEHD datasets. There 
was no significant difference between the match rates for men and women, nor 
between those aged under 30 and those aged at least 30. 
 
3. Imputation approach 
 Using the merged job-level dataset, an imputation model for initial tenure (in 
quarters) is developed. Since there is a spike at zero quarters, tenure is modeled by two 
variables: a dummy variable for whether the person worked zero quarters and the 
number of quarters the person worked if it is greater than zero. The latter only takes 
non-missing values when the former is zero. Sequential Regression Multivariate 
Imputation (SRMI) is used to complete these two variables. 
 The data, Y, are partitioned as follows: 
 ) . (4.14) ,( obsmis YYY =
 In this study,  includes the two tenure variables, while  includes age, 
payroll in the firm, seven dummies for race/ethnicity, three dummies for foreign born 
status, ten dummies for industry and 24 dummies for state of employment.
misY obsY
7 
 The missing data matrix M is dimension 2×N  and consists of zeros for non-
missing observations and ones for missing observations. 
 We are interested in the joint distribution of these matrices, which can be written 
as: 
 , (4.15) )
                                                
|,(),,|(),,,,( θYYψYYMψθMYY obsmisobsmisobsmis ppp =
 
7 The race/ethnicity categories are: not classified; white; black; American Indian; Asian/Pacific 
Islander; Hispanic (any race); and multiple races. The foreign born status categories are: born in the 
United States; born abroad to American parents; and born abroad to non-American parents. The 
industry categories are the SIC divisions, namely: agriculture, forestry and fishery; mining; 
construction; manufacturing; transportation; communications; electric, gas and sanitary services; 
wholesale trade; finance; insurance and real estate; services; and public administration. 
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where ψ  and θ  are parameters associated with the missing data mechanism and 
complete data model, respectively. SRMI requires that Bayesian ignorability be 
assumed, in other words that the data are both missing at random: 
 ) , (4.16) ,|(),,|( ψYMψYYM obsobsmis pp =
and that the joint distribution of the parameters may be factorized: 
 . (4.17) )()(),( ψθψθ ppp =
 The predictions of the missing data from SRMI are then obtained by sampling 
from the following conditional density: 
 , (4.18) θYθθYYYY dppp obsobsmisobsmis ∫= )|(),|()|(
which is equivalent to: 
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 The procedure consists of L regression rounds. In this case, L was set equal to 4. In 
round , missing values of  are drawn from the conditional density: 1+l ky
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where  denotes the completed data in round l for variable ,  is specified by an 
approximate linear model and 
l
ky ky kp
kθ  are the parameters of that model. Hence, at round l, 
the variable under imputation is regressed on all non-missing data and the most 
recently-imputed values of missing data. Here, linear regression is used for the log of 
number of quarters and logit is used for the zero quarters dummy variable. 
 In practice, data are stratified in order to achieve more homogenous groups of 
observations and the SRMI procedure is repeated on each stratum separately. Where 
cells sizes become too small, strata are combined. In this case, the data were initially 
stratified by sex, the decile of people’s average real quarterly income (in 2000 dollars) 
over the remainder of their job tenure and the decile of the number of remaining 
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quarters they spent on the job. These were collapsed to quintiles where necessary. The 
minimum cell size was set to 1500 observations. 
 An SRMI routine that was written for SAS by Gary Benedetto and Simon 
Woodcock was used. This allowed the continuous tenure variable to be constrained to 
be greater than zero but less than the maximum job tenure observed in the SIPP data 
as of the initial Snapshot period (262 quarters) and less than the number of quarters 
since the person was 15. The logarithm of the number of quarters was used in the 
imputation procedure in order to more closely approximate normality; the variable was 
untransformed after the procedure and rounded to the nearest integer. This routine uses 
the Bayes Information Criterion to determine which regressors to include in each 
regression.8 
 Table 4.2 shows the distribution of the imputed tenure values (i.e. those for the 
first quarter each state appears in the UI data) alongside the distribution of the 
complete SIPP tenure variable and the distribution of the uncensored LEHD values in 
the sample that will be used for the regressions in the next section. As noted earlier, 
there is a spike at zero quarters in the SIPP data. Otherwise, the LEHD complete data 
features a greater number of short job spells. This is not surprising, since only those 
jobs from the SIPP that are matched to the LEHD are included here. In most cases, the 
source year of the SIPP information is later than the year each state entered the LEHD 
dataset. That means that short job spells from the SIPP are not captured. The 
distribution of tenure in the imputed dataset is slightly different from the original SIPP 
data. This is due to it having a different distribution of the stratifying and conditioning 
variables used in the imputation model. When cells with the same characteristics are 
compared, the distributions look very similar. 
                                                 
8 Regressors are dropped if their t-statistics are less than 2)ln(N , where N is the number of 
observations. 
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Table 4.2 
Distribution of tenure in complete and imputed data 
 
Tenure (in quarters) SIPP data (%) LEHD imputed data 
(%) 
LEHD complete data 
(%) 
Men    
0 26.20 29.75 22.63 
1-3 10.41 11.45 31.36 
4-7 8.93 12.97 18.27 
8-19 16.47 20.28 20.31 
20-39 14.35 13.39 6.83 
40 or more 23.64 12.16 0.60 
Number of observations 20,349 41,554,058 74,707,034 
Women    
0 24.74 29.20 21.62 
1-3 11.68 12.41 31.54 
4-7 10.53 14.13 18.86 
8-19 18.45 21.10 20.71 
20-39 15.15 12.83 6.71 
40 or more 19.45 10.33 0.56 
Number of observations 18,872 37,546,454 70,101,968 
Notes: The LEHD imputed data include every observation from the first quarter a state entered the 
LEHD dataset; the LEHD complete data include observations for all jobs that began after the 
first quarter, for the 5% random sample only. 
 
4. Some results 
 Having imputed missing initial values for tenure in the LEHD data, it is now 
possible to use this variable in analyses. For jobs that began after a state entered the 
dataset, tenure (in quarters) can be calculated exactly – this is the number of quarters a 
person has received positive earnings from a firm (defined by SEIN). For jobs that 
began before or during the first quarter of the LEHD data for a state, tenure would be 
imputed. In practice, M implicates of the completed tenure variable would be 
constructed and then merged into a job-quarter-level dataset. All means and regression 
estimates would then be averaged over the M implicates and standard errors would 
reflect the fact that there is variation both within and between the implicates. 
 Table 4.3 reports the results of log wage regressions using the completed tenure 
variable for men aged 15-64. Quarterly observations for each of the 25 states in the 
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Table 4.3 
Log wage regressions for men 
 
Variable (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Age (in years) 0.151* 
(0.000) 
0.193* 
(0.000) 
0.192* 
(0.000) 
0.189* 
(0.000) 
Age squared -0.002* 
(0.000) 
-0.002* 
(0.000) 
-0.002* 
(0.000) 
-0.002* 
(0.000) 
Tenure (in quarters) 0.030* 
(0.000) 
0.019* 
(0.000) 
0.017* 
(0.000) 
0.018* 
(0.000) 
Tenure squared -0.000* 
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
Average co-worker education   0.103* 
(0.000) 
0.070* 
(0.000) 
Average co-worker tenure   0.004* 
(0.000) 
0.006* 
(0.000) 
Education × average co-
worker education 
   0.002* 
(0.000) 
Tenure × average co-worker 
tenure 
   -0.000* 
(0.000) 
Person effects No Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.290 0.686 0.690 0.690 
Number of observations 61,928,653 61,928,653 61,928,653 61,928,653 
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 1% level. 
LEHD dataset are included up to the final quarter of 2003. To reduce computational 
requirements, a 5% random sample of workers was taken for each state.9 In addition, 
as a preliminary analysis, only one implicate of initial tenure was used. Observations 
from firms with fewer than 5 workers are dropped and quarterly earnings observations 
less than $250 or more than $250,000 (in 2000 dollars) are also excluded. The full 
specification to be estimated is similar to that used by Metcalfe and Sloane (2007): 
  itiititititititit EeTEAAw 765
2
43
2
210ln βββτβτββββ +++++++=
  itiititT εθτβ +++ 8 , (4.21) 
where  is the earnings received by person i in quarter t,  is the person’s age in 
years, 
itw
it
itA
τ  is job tenure in quarters,  is years of schooling,  is the average years of ie itE
                                                 
9 Observations from all jobs and all quarters for the selected workers are used. 
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schooling in the person’s workplace,  is the average tenure in the workplace and itT iθ  
is a person effect, which is treated here as a fixed effect. 
 In the first column, the only regressors are age and tenure and their squares. Log 
wages are found to be concave in both age and tenure. At the mean, a one year 
increase in age results in a 2.8% increase in quarterly earnings, while a one quarter 
increase in job tenure yields a 2.4% increase. The estimated coefficients imply that, on 
average, men experience increasing wages until they have worked at a firm for 20 
years, while the effect of age becomes negative after 45. When person effects are 
introduced in the second column of Table 4.3, the wage-age profile becomes slightly 
steeper, while the wage-tenure profile flattens. 
 In the third column of Table 4.3, the average education level and tenure across all 
workers in an individual’s workplace are added as regressors. These variables are 
calculated separately for each quarter. Both are found to have a positive effect on an 
individual’s wage, suggesting that positive human capital spillovers do occur within 
firms. A one year increase in the average education level within a firm will increase a 
worker’s wage by 10.3%, while a one year increase in the average tenure will increase 
the wage by 1.5%, ceteris paribus. The estimated coefficient on co-worker education 
is remarkably similar to the 12% found by Metcalfe and Sloane (2007) in the United 
Kingdom, despite the fact that many fewer additional factors are controlled for here. 
 To examine whether the effect of co-worker ability differs across individuals, the 
final column of Table 4.3 adds as regressors the interaction of individual education 
and average firm education and the interaction of individual tenure and average firm 
tenure. The education interaction term is found to have a positive coefficient and 
indicates that the wage effect of co-worker education varies between 7.0% for men 
with no education and 11.1% for men with a college degree (i.e. 17 years of 
schooling). This result contrasts with that of Metcalfe and Sloane, who found a 
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Table 4.4 
Log wage regressions for women 
 
Variable (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Age (in years) 0.147* 
(0.000) 
0.210* 
(0.000) 
0.200* 
(0.000) 
0.197* 
(0.000) 
Age squared -0.002* 
(0.000) 
-0.002* 
(0.000) 
-0.002* 
(0.000) 
-0.002* 
(0.000) 
Tenure (in quarters) 0.043* 
(0.000) 
0.029* 
(0.000) 
0.026* 
(0.000) 
0.029* 
(0.000) 
Tenure squared -0.000* 
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
Average co-worker education   0.195* 
(0.000) 
0.105* 
(0.001) 
Average co-worker tenure   0.008* 
(0.000) 
0.011* 
(0.000) 
Education × average co-
worker education 
   0.007* 
(0.000) 
Tenure × average co-worker 
tenure 
   -0.000* 
(0.000) 
Person effects No Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.216 0.564 0.573 0.573 
Number of observations 65,514,365 65,514,365 65,514,365 65,514,365 
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 1% level. 
negative interaction effect for education, which they interpreted as evidence of an 
“intra-workplace competitive effect”. The tenure interaction term has a negative 
coefficient. This implies that average co-worker tenure has a negative effect on 
earnings for those individuals who have worked at a firm for more than 11 years.  
 Table 4.4 repeats the analysis for women in the twenty-five state sample. The 
earnings-tenure profile is found to be slightly steeper than for men. Both co-worker 
tenure and co-worker education have larger effects on women’s earnings than on 
men’s. In addition, the interaction of workplace education with individual education is 
noticeably larger than among men. Average co-worker education has a 10.5% effect 
on the earnings of women with no schooling, compared with a 21.7% effect on the 
earnings of women with college degrees. As with men, co-worker tenure has a 
negative effect after 11 years of employment at a firm. 
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5. Conclusion 
 This paper has outlined a procedure to complete missing values for job tenure in 
the matched employer-employee data that has been developed by the United States 
Census Bureau. This used sequential regression multivariate imputation and drew on 
retrospective job start date information contained in the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation. The completed tenure variable, along with years of education, 
was used in a set of wage regressions. Both variables were found to have a concave 
relationship with earnings. To examine the effects of co-worker ability on an 
individual’s earnings, the average education and tenure within each firm were added 
as regressors. Both were found to have a positive impact on wages, with larger 
coefficients for women. When the interaction of own and firm tenure was added to the 
regression, it was revealed that the wage effects of average tenure are strongest for 
new hires in a firm. In contrast, the strongest effect of average education on pay is 
experienced by the highest-educated workers in a firm. 
 The regressions presented in this paper represent a first attempt to examine the 
effects that co-worker experience have on earnings. Future work will extend the basic 
specification of the wage equation. Firm effects will be added, as in the specification 
of Abowd et al. (1999). In addition, a modification of the approach taken by 
Lengermann (2002) could be used. As noted earlier, Lengermann used an iterative 
procedure, whereby he calculated the average of the person effects across each firm in 
one stage and included it as a regressor in the next stage. An alternative approach 
would be to calculate either a weighted average of the person effects within the firm or 
to average across only certain workers. For example, the average person effect among 
only those earning above or below a certain threshold could be calculated and included 
in a regression. By determining how closely these variables are related to individual 
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wages, this would provide evidence of whether the models such as those of Rosen 
(1982) and Kremer (1993) hold. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 4.A1 
States in the LEHD data 
 
State Abbreviation ICF quarters EHF quarters ECF quarters 
California CA 1991iii-2003iv 1991iii-2003iv 1991i-2003iv 
Colorado CO 1990i-2004i 1990i-2004i 1990i-2004i 
Florida FL 1992iv-2004i 1992iv-2004i 1989i-2004i 
Idaho ID 1990i-2004i 1990i-2004i 1991i-2004i 
Illinois IL 1990i-2004i 1990i-2004i 1990i-2004i 
Indiana IN 1990i-2004i 1990i-2004i 1998i-2004i 
Iowa IA 1998iv-2004i 1998iv-2004i 1990i-2004i 
Kansas KS 1990i-2004i 1990i-2004i 1990i-2004i 
Kentucky KY 1996iv-2004i 1997i-2004i 2001i-2004i 
Maine ME 1996i-2004i 1996i-2004i 1996i-2004i 
Maryland MD 1985ii-2004ii 1985ii-2003iv 1990i-2004i 
Minnesota MN 1994iii-2003iv 1994iii-2003iv 1994iii-2003iv 
Missouri MO 1990i-2004i 1990i-2004i 1990i-2004i 
Montana MT 1993i-2004i 1993i-2004i 1993i-2004i 
New Jersey NJ 1996i-2004i 1996i-2004i 1995i-2004i 
New Mexico NM 1995iii-2004i 1995iii-2004ii 1990i-2004i 
North Carolina NC 1991i-2003iv 1991i-2003iv 1990i-2003iv 
Oklahoma OK 2000i-2004i 2000i-2004ii 1999i-2004i 
Oregon OR 1991i-2004i 1991i-2004i 1990i-2004i 
Pennsylvania PA 1991i-2004i 1991i-2004i 1991i-2004i 
Texas TX 1995i-2003iv 1995i-2003iv 1990i-2003iv 
Virginia VA 1998i-2004i 1998i-2004i 1995iii-2004i 
Washington WA 1990i-2004i 1990i-2004i 1990i-2004i 
West Virginia WV 1997i-2004i 1997i-2004i 1990i-2004i 
Wisconsin WI 1990i-2004i 1990i-2004i 1990i-2004i 
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5. Conclusion 
 
 This dissertation has uncovered evidence that individuals’ levels of human capital 
are not determined solely by their own actions, as is implicitly assumed by most 
models of education and labor supply, but are influenced by the decisions of those 
people they live and work with. In Chapter 2, it was shown that married women, but 
not men, respond to changes in the risk of divorce by increasing the hours they spend 
in the labor market, possibly with the aim of improving their future job prospects in 
the event of separation. In Chapter 3, evidence was reported suggesting that 
professional baseball players experience both transitory and permanent increases in 
productivity from having talented team-mates. Similar productivity spillovers were 
found to exist in the wider labor market in Chapter 4, where it was seen that, ceteris 
paribus, workers earn higher wages when their colleagues have higher levels of 
education or experience. These effects are largest for the highest-educated but least-
experienced workers. 
 Overall, these findings indicate the need to take account of the effects labor market 
policies have on productivity levels across the economy as a whole. Changing 
demographics and social trends may make this an even more important issue in the 
future. If the divorce rate continues to fall, it is likely to become increasingly difficult 
to entice more married women into the labor market and wages may need to rise faster 
to compensate. At the same time, the move towards work at non-standard hours and at 
home may reduce the degree of productivity spillovers between co-workers within a 
firm. 
 Future work should address exactly who experiences productivity spillovers and 
what specific skills they acquire as a result. Using time-use data, it may be possible to 
examine whether men tend to invest in household-specific skills when faced with 
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marital instability, in the same way that women devote more time to labor market 
work. Regarding productivity spillovers in the workplace, research should address the 
issue of who learns from whom. Do senior employees in a firm increase the 
productivity of those further down the job ladder or vice versa? 
